Jennifer B. Nuzzo 3 ways to prepare society for the next pandemic TED

So I’m an infectious disease
epidemiologist,

and it used to be the case
that when I would tell people that,

they would ask me if it had
something to do with the skin.

(Laughter)

But thanks to COVID-19, most people
have now heard of epidemiologists.

So these days,
when I tell people what I do,

the questions I get asked
most frequently are more like:

When does this end?

When do things go back to how they were?

I get it.

I am very eager
to stop worrying about COVID-19.

But these questions
seem to be imbued with a hope

that when we get
to the other side of all this,

our prepandemic lives
are just going to be waiting for us.

Now this pandemic will end.

But it won’t be possible
just to go back to how it was in 2019.

Now that may sound bleak,
but I assure you, it doesn’t have to be.

Let me tell you a story
that’s been giving me some hope.

Feeling better about this.

Baltimore 1904.

A lit cigarette was left in the basement

of the six-story Hurst building.

Within a half an hour, the fire grew
to an out-of-control conflagration.

Local firefighters
were quickly overwhelmed,

so crews came in from neighboring cities.

But when they arrived,
they couldn’t hook up their hoses

because in 1904

there were over 600 variations
of hose couplings

on hydrants in the United States.

The fire destroyed
more than 1,500 buildings,

2,500 businesses.

And when it was finally extinguished,

the burnt district, as it was called,
spanned more than 80 blocks.

Fortunately, just a few people died,

but that was probably a function of luck

due to the fact that the fire
broke out in a business district

that was uninhabited on the weekends.

The story of the Great Baltimore Fire
of 1904 is important for a few reasons.

To this day, it is one of the largest
urban conflagrations in US history.

And in today’s money,

the toll of this one event
is upwards of three billion dollars.

But the Great Fire is remarkable
not just for its tolls

but for what happened afterwards.

Witnessing the devastation that was caused
by a single unattended cigarette

prompted massive change

in how Baltimore
and the rest of the country

protect itself against urban fires.

We saw changes in three major areas.

First, we began using data
to make buildings safer

and to improve the way
we respond to fires.

Governments passed ordinances

that became the basis
of the first building codes:

standards that inform
the design and construction of buildings

to make them more resistant to fire

and to protect the people
that occupy them.

We installed fire alarms so that we could
detect and pinpoint fires in buildings

as soon as they occur

and alert people of the need to evacuate.

And we created national standards
for firefighting equipment

so that crews coming out of state
could hook up their hoses.

The second area of change is
that we created a culture of fire safety.

We regularly test fire alarms
and fire hydrants,

and we educate people
about the risk of fires,

how to prevent them
and what to do when one occurs.

You remember “stop, drop and roll”
fire drills in schools?

These exercises prime us to act
when the alarms go off.

Even if there’s
no noticeable sign of fire,

we know we’re supposed
to get out of the building

until someone tells us
it’s safe to go back.

The third area of change
was that we built up our fire defenses.

Communities across the country
created and staffed fire departments

so that they’d be ready
to respond in emergencies.

And because we don’t know
when the next fire is going to occur,

we operate our fire defenses
24 hours a day, every day,

and we don’t get rid of our fire defenses

just because we haven’t had a fire
for a couple of years.

Data, drills and defense.

The collective impact of changes
implemented in the US since 1904

has meant that we no longer have
the same number of great urban fires

that were so frequent
in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Now I first came
to Baltimore 17 years ago,

actually when the city was gearing up

to commemorate the 100th anniversary
of the Great Fire.

I came to study
infectious disease outbreaks,

and even then, well before COVID-19,

it was abundantly clear
that the risk of our experiencing

a dangerous pandemic

was high and increasing.

By the year 2000,

the number of emerging infectious disease
outbreaks that was occurring

was four times greater than in the 1940s.

And in the last 17 years,
we have witnessed a string of events

that have each exposed vulnerabilities
in how we respond to infectious diseases

and have challenged us in ways
that should have made us really worried

how we’d fare when the big one hit.

I first heard about COVID December 2019.

I was on vacation with my family,

and in a few weeks we would learn

that the virus was spreading
easily between people.

As an epidemiologist,
that’s when the alarms went off.

At that point, most of my work
had been focused on other countries,

helping places develop
the tools they needed

to stop the spread of new diseases.

But it was becoming clear
the US was not taking the steps it needed

to protect us from the unfolding pandemic.

On February 5, 2020,

I testified before Congress
about the US experience of COVID,

and I said that
just closing travel to China

was not going to be sufficient,

that we urgently needed
to bolster our defenses.

We had a lot of reasons to be worried.

Due to budget cuts,

there were 250,000 fewer
public health workers in the US

than we needed.

Our hospitals weren’t ready
for a surge of patients,

and the outbreak in China
was causing disruptions

in global supplies of personal
protective equipment and medicines.

But our leaders didn’t heed those alarms.

While other countries, like South Korea,
snapped into action

developing COVID tests
and contact tracing programs,

the US remained in denial.

Instead of telling us
how to protect ourselves,

our political leaders tried to assure us
we had nothing to worry about.

Over the last year, I’ve worked

with the Johns Hopkins
Coronavirus Resource Center,

analyzing key COVID data

and gathering information
from governments around the world.

And for much of the pandemic,
we have had an inconsistent picture

of how much of a crisis
COVID has been here in the US

and who has been most affected

because states collect and report
COVID data in inconsistent ways.

Still today states report testing data,
vaccine data, COVID demographic data

differently.

Having nonstandard data,
unstandardized data,

in the midst of a pandemic

is like not being able
to hook up your hoses to the hydrants

when your country is burning down.

Today, our culture of safety
around infectious diseases is in shambles.

We finally have vaccines,
lifesaving tools to end the pandemic.

And too many of us won’t take them.

If we thought about pandemics
the way we thought about fires,

what we would do would be
to try to learn as much as possible

about our vulnerabilities during COVID

and work to ensure we are
never again left so unprotected.

We would commit to action in three areas.

Data, drills and defense.

First, we would develop systems
to ensure we have the data we need

to know when and where there’s danger
and how best to protect ourselves.

The next time there’s
a concerning outbreak in the world,

we wouldn’t just wait
until people get sick enough

to go to the hospital to test them.

We would go out
and start looking for infections

so that we could detect them
as early as possible.

And every case we find,
we would investigate it,

so that we could quickly learn

what specific places and activities
are most likely to get people sick

instead of just saying,
“Stay home, if you can, for two years.”

And we would develop
national data standards,

so that data from New Jersey

could be meaningfully compared
to data from Oklahoma.

The second area of action would be
to start building a culture of safety

that empowers us
as individuals and businesses

and community organizations
to protect ourselves and others.

We would work to ensure
that everyone had access to in-home tests

so that we could know if it’s safe
to go to work or to see family.

We would teach people about the threat,
how to protect themselves

and how not to spread it to others.

But this education
would be mostly a reminder

because we would be
practicing these skills

well in advance of the next pandemic.

We would use every flu season as a drill.

Long before COVID-19, Taiwan began
staging mass vaccination exercises

every flu season.

They did this to boost vaccination rates
in the most vulnerable,

but also to practice
how they would do it in a pandemic,

so that well in advance of a crisis,

people would know where and how
they would get a vaccine.

Now, at a time when the country
is incredibly divided,

I know it may seem impossible

that we could build this culture of safety
around infectious diseases that we need.

But I have spent the last year and a half
talking to all sorts of people

with a range of views on these issues,

from top leaders to QAnon believers.

And I assure you, we all want
to protect ourselves and our families.

But we need to build trust.

And we can’t do that

if we wait until the next crisis
to talk to each other.

The third area where we’d take action

is to build our defenses
against infectious diseases.

Instead of a skeletal
public health infrastructure

that waxes and wanes with every crisis,

we would maintain, for good,

a large cadre of highly skilled
public health professionals

who work day in and day out

to make our communities
healthier and safer

and be ready to respond in an emergency.

We’d reduce our structural vulnerabilities
to infectious diseases,

starting with our buildings,

updating our building codes
and ventilation systems

so that we could be assured

that these spaces
will not result in super spreading.

And we would implement economic defenses:

policies that provide
financial and social support to people

who need to stay home because they’re sick

or a loved one is sick
or they need to quarantine

so they don’t have to choose
between following public health guidance

and earning a paycheck.

Data, drills and defense.

If we acted

in these three ways,

we’d have a much better shot
of keeping the next pandemic threat

to a manageable outbreak

instead of a blazing inferno
that engulfs entire cities and countries.

When people ask me

when the pandemic is going to end,

I don’t think they’re also wondering
when the next one is going to occur.

They are, understandably,
focused on getting past this threat.

They want to know for how much longer
do we have to hold our breath

until the flames of the pandemic die down.

But conflagrations don’t end
just because one was put out.

The frequency and severity of fires
changes when changes are made.

The same is true for pandemics.

So when people ask me when are things
going to go back to how they were,

I have to say: hopefully never.

Thank you.

(Applause)

Helen Walters: Thank you.
Thank you so much. Thank you.

So you talked about trust in that –

and we’ve seen the vaccine rate,
when it’s available,

it’s really shockingly low,

and much of that
is really related to trust,

trust in the systems, trust in society.

What are ways that you think
that we can do a better job as a society

to convince people that vaccines are safe
and people should take them?

Jennifer B. Nuzzo: I think, first of all,
don’t give up on people.

I have seen people change.

And you have to come
at your conversations with people

from a place of empathy.

Try to understand why, right?

We don’t do enough of that,

trying to understand
why people feel that way,

and engage with them, hear them.

I have found that just simply
giving space to people,

to allow them to talk
about their anxieties and their concerns

and having the conversation

takes it from a culture war to just
a conversation between human beings.

And we’ve lost that ability,

and part of the pandemic
has taken that ability from us

because we’ve had few opportunities.

But we really do have to
talk to each other

and have the hard conversations,

and just recognize that we’re
all walking through this world

trying to get the same things,
trying to do the same thing.

HW: Well, thank you for everything
that you’re doing, Jennifer.

JBN: Thank you.

(Applause)

所以我是一名传染病
流行病学家

,过去的情况
是,当我告诉人们这件事时,

他们会问我这是否
与皮肤有关。

(笑声)

但是感谢 COVID-19,大多数
人现在都听说过流行病学家。

所以这些天来,
当我告诉人们我在做什么时,

我被问得
最多的问题更像是:

这什么时候结束?

什么时候事情会回到原来的样子?

我知道了。

我非常
渴望不再担心 COVID-19。

但这些问题
似乎充满了希望

,即当我们
到达这一切的另一端时,

我们的大流行前
生活就在等着我们。

现在这场流行病将结束。


要回到 2019 年的样子是不可能的。

现在这听起来可能很凄凉,
但我向你保证,它不必如此。

让我告诉你一个
给我一些希望的故事。

对此感觉好多了。

巴尔的摩 1904 年

。六层楼的赫斯特大楼的地下室里放着一根点燃的香烟

不到半个小时,火势就
发展成了失控的大火。

当地的
消防员很快就不堪重负,

因此工作人员从邻近城市赶来。

但是当他们到达时,
他们无法连接软管,

因为 1904 年美国的消防栓上

有超过 600
种软管接头

大火摧毁
了 1,500 多座建筑物、

2,500 家企业。

当它最终被扑灭时

,被称为被烧毁的地区
跨越了 80 多个街区。

幸运的是,只有少数人死亡,

但这可能是运气的作用,

因为
火灾发生在一个

周末无人居住的商业区。 1904 年

巴尔的摩大火的故事
之所以重要,有几个原因。

直到今天,它仍是美国历史上最大的
城市大火之一。

以今天的金钱计算,

这一事件的损失
超过 30 亿美元。

但大火的非凡之处
不仅在于其造成的损失,

还在于之后发生的事情。

目睹
一支无人看管的香烟造成的破坏

促使

巴尔的摩
和该国其他地区如何

保护自己免受城市火灾的巨大改变。

我们看到了三个主要领域的变化。

首先,我们开始使用数据
来提高建筑物的安全性

并改进
我们应对火灾的方式。

政府通过的法令

成为了第一部建筑规范的基础:这些

标准
为建筑物的设计和建造提供了依据,

以使它们更耐火


保护居住者。

我们安装了火灾警报器,以便我们能够
在建筑物发生火灾时立即检测和查明火灾,

并提醒人们需要撤离。

我们制定
了消防设备的国家标准,

以便外州工作人员
可以连接他们的软管。

第二个变化领域
是我们创造了一种消防安全文化。

我们定期测试火警警报器
和消火栓,

并教育人们
了解火灾的风险、

如何预防
以及发生火灾时应采取的措施。

你还记得学校里的“停止、下降和滚动”
消防演习吗?

这些练习让我们
在警报响起时采取行动。

即使
没有明显的火灾迹象,

我们也知道我们
应该离开大楼,

直到有人告诉我们
可以安全返回。

第三个变化领域
是我们建立了我们的防火系统。

全国各地的社区都
建立了消防部门并配备了人员,

以便他们准备
好应对紧急情况。

而且因为我们不知道
下一次火灾什么时候会发生,所以

我们每天 24 小时每天都在运行我们的防火系统

,我们不会

仅仅因为我们没有发生火灾就放弃我们的防火系统
。 几年。

数据、演习和防御。

自 1904 年以来在美国实施的变革的集体影响

意味着我们不再

像 19 世纪和 20 世纪初那样频繁发生相同数量的大城市火灾。

现在我第一次
来到巴尔的摩是在 17 年前,

当时这座城市正

准备纪念大火 100 周年

我是来研究
传染病爆发的

,即便如此,早在 COVID-19 之前,

很明显
我们

经历危险大流行

的风险很高并且还在增加。

到 2000 年,

新发传染病暴发的数量

是 1940 年代的四倍。

在过去的 17 年中,
我们目睹了一系列事件

,这些事件都暴露
了我们在应对传染病方面的脆弱性,


以本应让我们真正担心

当大流行病来袭时我们会如何应对的方式向我们提出挑战。

我第一次听说 COVID 是在 2019 年 12 月。

当时我正和家人一起度假

,几周后我们就会了解到

这种病毒很
容易在人与人之间传播。

作为流行病学家,
那是警报响起的时候。

那时,我的大部分工作
都集中在其他国家,

帮助地方开发

阻止新疾病传播所需的工具。

但很
明显,美国没有采取必要的措施

来保护我们免受正在蔓延的流行病的影响。

2020 年 2 月 5 日,

我在国会
就美国在 COVID 方面的经历作证时

说,
仅仅关闭对中国的旅行

是不够的

,我们迫切
需要加强防御。

我们有很多理由担心。

由于预算削减,

美国的公共卫生工作者

比我们需要的少了 250,000 人。

我们的医院还没有
为患者激增做好准备,

而中国的疫情正在

导致全球个人
防护设备和药品供应中断。

但我们的领导人没有注意到这些警报。

虽然韩国等其他国家迅速
采取行动

开发 COVID 测试
和接触者追踪计划

,但美国仍然否认。 我们的政治领导人没有

告诉我们
如何保护自己,而是

试图向我们保证
我们没有什么可担心的。

去年,我

与约翰霍普金斯
冠状病毒资源中心合作,

分析关键的 COVID 数据

并收集
来自世界各地政府的信息。

在大流行的大部分时间里,由于各州以不一致的方式收集和报告 COVID 数据,
我们对美国发生

了多少 COVID 危机

以及谁受到的影响最大,


方面的情况并不一致。

时至今日,各州仍以不同方式报告检测数据、
疫苗数据、COVID 人口

数据。

在大流行期间拥有非标准数据,非
标准化数据

就像

当您的国家正在烧毁时无法将软管连接到消防栓。

今天,我们
围绕传染病的安全文化一团糟。

我们终于有了疫苗和
拯救生命的工具来结束这场大流行。

我们中有太多人不会接受它们。

如果我们以
思考火灾的方式来思考流行病,

那么我们要做的就是
尽可能多地

了解我们在 COVID 期间的脆弱性,

并努力确保我们
再也不会如此不受保护。

我们将承诺在三个领域采取行动。

数据、演习和防御。

首先,我们将开发系统
以确保我们拥有所需的数据,

以了解何时何地存在危险
以及如何最好地保护自己。

下次
世界上爆发令人担忧的疫情时,

我们不会
等到人们病得很重

才去医院进行检测。

我们会走出
去开始寻找感染,

以便我们能够
尽早发现它们。

每发现一个病例,
我们都会对其进行调查,

以便我们能够快速了解

哪些特定地点和
活动最有可能使人们生病,

而不是仅仅说
“如果可以的话,呆在家里,呆两年”。

我们将制定
国家数据标准,

以便将新泽西州的

数据与俄克拉荷马州的数据进行有意义的比较。

第二个行动领域
是开始建立一种安全文化

,使我们
作为个人、企业

和社区组织
能够保护自己和他人。

我们将努力
确保每个人都可以进行家庭测试,

以便我们知道
上班或探亲是否安全。

我们会教人们有关威胁,
如何保护自己

以及如何不将其传播给他人。

但这种
教育主要是一种提醒,

因为我们

将在下一次大流行之前很好地练习这些技能。

我们会利用每个流感季节作为演习。

早在 COVID-19 之前,台湾就开始在每个流感季节
进行大规模疫苗接种活动

他们这样做是为了提高
最脆弱人群的疫苗接种率,

同时也是为了练习
在大流行病中如何做到这一点,

以便在危机发生之前,

人们就知道在哪里以及
如何接种疫苗。

现在,在这个
国家极度分裂的时候,

我知道我们似乎不可能

围绕我们需要的传染病建立这种安全文化。

但在过去的一年半里,我一直在

与对这些问题有不同看法的各种人交谈,

从最高领导人到 QAnon 信徒。

我向你保证,我们
都想保护自己和家人。

但我们需要建立信任。

如果我们等到下一次危机
才能相互交谈,我们就无法做到这一点。

我们将采取行动的第三个领域

是建立我们
对传染病的防御。

我们将永远维持

一大批高技能的
公共卫生专业人员

,他们日复一日地工作

,使我们的社区
更健康、更安全,

并准备好应对 在紧急情况下。

我们将减少我们对传染病的结构脆弱
性,

从我们的建筑物开始,

更新我们的建筑规范
和通风系统,

这样我们就可以

确信这些空间
不会导致超级传播。

我们将实施经济防御:

那些因生病或亲人生病或需要隔离而需要留在家中的人提供经济和社会支持的政策,

这样他们就不必
在遵循公共卫生指南之间做出选择

并获得薪水。

数据、演习和防御。

如果我们

以这三种方式采取行动,

我们将有更好
的机会将下一次流行病威胁控制

在可控的爆发范围内,

而不是
席卷整个城市和国家的熊熊烈火。

当人们问我

大流行何时结束时,

我认为他们也不会想
知道下一次大流行何时会发生。

可以理解的是,
他们专注于克服这一威胁。

他们想知道

,在大流行的火焰熄灭之前,我们还要屏住呼吸多久。

但大火不会
仅仅因为一场被扑灭而结束。

发生变化时,火灾的频率和严重程度会发生
变化。

流行病也是如此。

所以当人们问我事情
什么时候会回到原来的样子时,

我不得不说:希望永远不会。

谢谢你。

(掌声)

Helen Walters:谢谢。
太感谢了。 谢谢你。

所以你谈到了信任

——我们已经看到疫苗接种率,
当它可用时,

它真的非常低,

其中大部分

信任、对系统的信任、对社会的信任有关。


认为作为一个社会,我们可以通过哪些方式更好

地说服人们疫苗是安全的
并且人们应该服用它们?

Jennifer B. Nuzzo:我认为,首先,
不要放弃人。

我看到了人们的变化。

而且你必须与

来自同理心的人交谈。

试着理解为什么,对吧?

我们在这方面做得还不够,

试图理解
人们为什么会有这种感觉,

并与他们互动,倾听他们。

我发现,只是简单地
给人们空间

,让他们
谈论他们的焦虑和担忧

并进行对话,

就可以把它从一场文化战争变成
一场人与人之间的对话。

我们已经失去了这种能力,

而大流行的一部分
已经夺走了我们的这种能力,

因为我们几乎没有机会。

但我们确实
必须互相

交谈并进行艰难的对话,

并认识到我们
都在这个世界上行走,

试图得到同样的东西,
试图做同样的事情。

HW:嗯,谢谢你所做的一切
,詹妮弗。

JBN:谢谢。

(掌声)