How online marketplaces can help local economies not hurt them Amane Dannouni

Translator: Ivana Korom
Reviewer: Krystian Aparta

In February 2013,
my wife and I moved to Singapore.

Exactly at the same time,

Uber has announced
it started operations in the country.

Now, my wife and I
agree on a lot of things,

but using Uber was definitely
not one of them.

While I was excited about the technology

and how maybe we don’t need
to own cars anymore,

she felt that every Uber car
is here to steal jobs from taxi drivers.

And Sarah was not the only one.

As the Ubers, Airbnbs
and Amazons of the world –

what we call “online marketplaces” –

as they started expanding their presence,

we have heard, all of us,
countless policymakers

worried about how to deal
with these new risks

of job destruction, lower wages
and tax leakage.

We’ve also heard company leaders

worried about aggressive competition
from global platforms

eating up their local businesses.

And on the rational level,
of course I understand.

After all, this is basic
supply and demand economics.

If, in any market,
you dramatically increase supply,

you should expect prices, profitability
and growth to go down

for existing players.

But in my personal experience,

I’ve also seen
the other side of the story.

Where online marketplaces,

like Gojek in Indonesia
or Jumia in Africa,

have helped their business ecosystems
and the communities around them.

The positive side I have seen

demonstrated itself in a woman,
a taxi driver in Egypt,

that now had the opportunity to work

without the harassment
she faced in the taxi business.

It demonstrated itself
through a village in Kenya

that got an economic boost,

because the nearby beautiful
but completely unknown lake

is now becoming
a national ecotourism spot.

Online marketplaces will continue to grow.

And they will transform the way we shop,

the way we travel

and the way we transact with each other.

So we really need to understand

where is the truth
between those two stories.

Should we expect more of the bright side

or more of the dark and worrying side?

And is there a way to get
the first without getting the second?

I believe there is.

As a strategy consultant,
I study businesses for a living.

And as a mathematician at heart,

I couldn’t live with something
and its opposite being equally true.

So, I went back to fundamentals,
and I asked the question:

What do online marketplaces really do?

What do they do?

Well, at their core,

they’re doing something very simple.

They match sellers and buyers.

That’s it.

For drivers and passengers,

you get Uber, Grab in Southeast Asia

or DiDi in China.

For matching merchants and consumers,

you get Amazon, Alibaba
or Jumia in Africa.

And for housing, you get Airbnb;

for fundraising, you get Kickstarter –

the list goes on.

What all these examples have in common

is that they transition
this basic functionality

of matching sellers and buyers

from the physical world
to the digital world.

And by doing so,

they can find better matches,

do it faster

and ultimately, unlock
more value for everyone.

In fact, online marketplaces' core benefit

is that they get us more
from the same amount of effort.

For example,

if you’re a taxi driver in San Francisco

and you decide to work 10 hours per day,

then you’re actually having
a paying passenger in your car

for four hours out of the 10.

If you take the same car
and put it on a platform like Uber,

you can have paying passengers

for an additional one and a half hours.

This is the same car
becoming 40 percent more productive.

And the same has been proven true
for other online marketplaces.

By design, they create
more value for the economy.

Now, we need to figure out
who gets this additional value.

You can give it to the drivers –

more passengers, more income.

You can give it to consumers,
if you reduce prices.

Or you can decide that the platform
gets to keep all of it.

What usually happens
is that all three of them

would somehow split it.

But what about the rest of us?

We can also be impacted

without being on either sides
of this business.

If my neighbor decides
to rent his apartment on Airbnb,

and we have more people
coming in and out of the building,

more noise than usual,

then I’m getting an unpleasant side effect
of this productivity magic.

This is what economists would call
a “negative externality.”

The negative externality
of Uber cars becoming more productive

is taxi drivers seeing the value
of their licenses drop

by as much as 30 percent
in New York, for example.

This is the dark side.

And this is what sparks
street demonstrations

and sometimes,
sometimes, even violence.

I profoundly believe this is avoidable.

And it became clearer to me

the more I have spent time
in emerging markets.

In fact, during my time in Singapore,

I spent half of any given week
traveling in the region,

between Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia,

and I became a user –

actually, more of a fan –

of online marketplaces
that were not that well-known back then.

But some of them made
interesting strategic trade-offs

that dramatically reduced
their side effects,

their externalities.

Take Gojek, for example.

They’re basically Uber for motor bikes.

They are one of the most liked
online marketplaces in Indonesia,

and this has a lot to do
with the role they chose to play.

Instead of picking a fight

with every other transportation
option out there,

they choose to gradually integrate them
within their own platform,

so that without leaving the Gojek app,

you can check the public
transportation schedule

and choose to take a bus
for a long distance.

Then, maybe, a motorbike
or a traditional taxi

that you can order and pay for
from within the same app.

If you look at Gojek today,

nine out of 10 previous motor taxi drivers

believe their quality of life has improved
after joining the platform.

And nine out of 10 consumers –

nine out of 10 –

believe that Gojek has a positive impact
on society in general.

Now, this level of trust
is what allowed Gojek to grow

into what is today a super
online marketplace for everything

from food to grocery

even massages and laundry pickups.

It all came from a deliberate trade-off

to be an orchestrator
of a bigger ecosystem

where others also have their role to play,

instead of a single winner, a hero,

that takes for himself what would,
at the end, be a smaller pie.

Another interesting example is Jumia.

Jumia is the equivalent
of Amazon in Africa.

But they don’t generate
the same level of fear

in the small-business community.

And one of the reasons for that

is because they have decided
to actively invest

in African entrepreneurs,

to grow them into the digital age.

Now keep in mind,

Jumia is operating in countries
with some of the lowest digital literacy

and digital connectivity
scores in the world.

Now they could have dealt with that

the usual way, through
lobbying for reforms –

and they probably do that –

but they have also built Jumia University,

an e-learning platform

where merchants can come and learn
basic digital and business skills.

We have studied online marketplaces
in Africa last year.

And during that study,
we have met one of Jumia’s merchants.

His name is Jomo.

He was fired from his job in 2014,

and at that time, he decided
he wanted to become his own boss.

He wanted to be independent.

He also wanted to never be fired again.

So at that time,

Jomo had no clue what a business is.

So he needed to go through
a series of trainings

to learn how to select products,
how to price them

and how to promote them online.

Today, Jomo has a 10-employee
online business.

And as of a few months ago,

he just opened his very first
brick-and-mortar shop

in the suburbs of Nairobi.

Now, through its university,

Jumia has the potential
of helping a huge number of Jomos.

And we have estimated that together
with other online marketplaces

on the continent,

they can generate three million
additional jobs by 2025.

And they would do that either directly,

or through their impact
on the wider community.

And sometimes,

taking that wider impact
into consideration

or forgetting about it

can make or break a platform.

To illustrate that,
let’s go back to Singapore.

So, when we decided with my wife
to leave the country last year,

Uber decided to do the same.

At the same time,

again, we started to see that pattern,

but maybe it’s a coincidence.

In reality, Uber lost
the ride-hailing battle

to a Malaysian-born start-up called Grab.

Now, interestingly,

my wife didn’t have the same
level of concerns with Grab,

because when Grab started,
it had a different name.

It was called MyTeksi,

and as the name suggests,
it started as a platform for taxis.

So when Grab started expanding
the driver pool beyond taxis,

it was seen as gradual and reasonable.

They were also very careful
while doing so.

They thought of what kind
of social safety net

they should bring to all drivers.

So they put in place
special insurance packages

and even financial education programs.

Now, compare that
with what happened in London,

in New York, in Paris,

where taxi drivers didn’t feel
that the platforms understood

they had to pay 200,000 euros
for their license –

and mostly in loans.

When you don’t take that kind
of social environmental information

into account,

you get strong reactions.

I’m not trying to argue
that the trade-offs

by either Grab or Jumia
or Gojek are risk-free.

Did they slow down growth
at some point, temporarily?

Maybe.

But look at them today.

Gojek is worth 10 billion dollars.

Jumia is one of only three unicorns
in the whole of Africa.

And Grab, well, they pushed out Uber

out of the whole region of Southeast Asia.

And I also think these trade-offs
have nothing specific to emerging markets.

Amazon or Uber or others
can learn from them

and adapt them to their own realities.

In the long run,

this doesn’t need to be a zero-sum game.

In the long run –

and this is maybe the Asian
side of me speaking –

it pays to be patient.

It pays to reconsider
your goal and your priorities

in the light of a much bigger equation

that includes you
and your users, of course,

but also it includes regulators,

policymakers, your communities.

And I would argue, above all,

it includes the very businesses
you are meant to disrupt.

Thank you.

(Applause)

译者:Ivana Korom
审稿人:Krystian Aparta

2013 年 2 月
,我和妻子搬到了新加坡。

正是在同一时间,

优步
宣布开始在该国开展业务。

现在,我和妻子
在很多事情上达成了一致,

但使用优步绝对
不是其中之一。

虽然我对这项技术

以及我们可能
不再需要拥有汽车感到兴奋,

但她觉得每辆优步汽车
都是为了从出租车司机那里抢走工作。

莎拉不是唯一一个。

作为世界上的优步、Airbnb
和亚马逊——

我们称之为“在线市场”——

当他们开始扩大他们的存在时,

我们听到,我们所有人,
无数的政策制定者

担心如何
应对这些

破坏工作的新风险 ,降低工资
和漏税。

我们还听到公司领导人

担心
来自全球平台的激烈竞争会

吞噬他们的本地业务。

在理性的层面上
,我当然理解。

毕竟,这是基本的
供需经济学。

如果您在任何市场
大幅增加供应,

您应该预期现有参与者的价格、盈利能力
和增长会

下降。

但以我个人的经验,

我也看到
了故事的另一面。

在线市场,

如印度尼西亚的
Gojek 或非洲的 Jumia

,帮助了他们的商业生态系统
和他们周围的社区。

在埃及的一名出租车司机身上看到了积极的一面

,她现在有机会工作,

而不会
受到出租车行业的骚扰。


通过肯尼亚的一个村庄展示了自己,该村庄

获得了经济增长,

因为附近美丽
但完全不为人知的湖泊

现在正在
成为国家生态旅游胜地。

在线市场将继续增长。

它们将改变我们的购物

方式、

旅行方式以及我们相互交易的方式。

所以我们真的需要了解

这两个故事之间的真相在哪里。

我们应该期待更多光明的一面

还是更多的黑暗和令人担忧的一面?

有没有办法
获得第一个而不获得第二个?

我相信有。

作为一名战略顾问,
我以研究企业为生。

作为一个内心深处的数学家,

我不能忍受一些事情,
而它的反面同样是正确的。

所以,我回到了基本面
,我问了一个问题:

在线市场到底是做什么的?

他们在做什么?

嗯,在他们的核心,

他们正在做一些非常简单的事情。

他们匹配卖家和买家。

而已。

对于司机和乘客,

你可以选择优步、东南亚的

Grab 或中国的滴滴。

对于匹配的商家和消费者,

您可以在非洲找到亚马逊、阿里巴巴
或 Jumia。

而对于住房,你会得到 Airbnb;

对于筹款,你会得到

Kickstarter——名单还在继续。

所有这些示例的共同之处

在于,它们

将匹配买卖双方的基本功能

从物理世界
转移到了数字世界。

通过这样做,

他们可以找到更好的匹配

,更快地完成

,最终
为每个人释放更多价值。

事实上,在线市场的核心优势

在于,它们能让我们
从同样的努力中获得更多收益。

例如,

如果您是旧金山的一名出租车司机,

并且您决定每天工作 10 小时,

那么您实际上在 10 小时中
有 4 小时有付费乘客在您的

车上。

如果您乘坐同一辆车
并且 把它放在像优步这样的平台上,

你可以让付费乘客多花

一个半小时。

这是同一
辆车的生产力提高了 40%。

其他在线市场也证明了这一点。

通过设计,它们
为经济创造更多价值。

现在,我们需要弄清楚
谁获得了这个附加值。

你可以把它给司机——

更多的乘客,更多的收入。 如果您降低价格

,您可以将其提供给消费者

或者您可以决定让平台
保留所有这些。

通常发生的情况
是,他们三个

都会以某种方式分裂它。

但是我们其他人呢?

我们也可能受到影响,

而无需
处于该业务的任何一方。

如果我的邻居决定
在 Airbnb 上租他的公寓,

而且我们有更多的
人进出大楼,

噪音比平时更多,

那么我就会
从这种生产力魔法中得到一个令人不快的副作用。

这就是经济学家所说
的“负外部性”。

例如
,优步汽车变得更有效率的负面外部性

是出租车司机看到
他们的执照价值在纽约下降

了多达 30%

这是黑暗的一面。

这就是引发
街头示威


有时甚至是暴力的原因。

我深信这是可以避免的。

我在新兴市场

花费的时间越多,我就越清楚

事实上,在新加坡期间,

我每周有一半的
时间在该地区旅行,往返于

马来西亚、泰国、印度尼西亚之间

,我成为了在线市场的用户——

实际上,更多的是粉丝

——这些在线
市场并非如此。 当年家喻户晓。

但他们中的一些人做出了
有趣的战略权衡

,大大减少
了副作用

和外部性。

以 Gojek 为例。

他们基本上是摩托车的优步。

他们是印度尼西亚最受欢迎的
在线市场之一

,这
与他们选择扮演的角色有很大关系。

他们没有

与其他所有交通
方式争吵,

而是选择将它们逐渐整合
到自己的平台中

,这样您就可以在不离开 Gojek 应用程序的情况下

查看公共
交通时刻表


选择乘坐长途巴士。

然后,也许

,您可以
在同一个应用程序中订购和支付摩托车或传统出租车。

如果你今天看看 Gojek,

过去 10 名出租车司机中有 9 名

认为加入该平台后他们的生活质量有所提高

十分之九的消费者——

十分之九的消费者——

认为 Gojek
对整个社会都有积极的影响。

现在,正是这种程度的信任
让 Gojek 成长

为今天的超级
在线市场,

从食品到杂货,

甚至按摩和洗衣取货,应有尽有。

这一切都来自一个刻意的权衡

,成为
一个更大的生态系统的协调者,在这个生态系统

中,其他人也可以发挥自己的作用,

而不是一个单一的赢家,一个英雄

,最终成为一个较小的馅饼。 .

另一个有趣的例子是 Jumia。

Jumia 相当于
非洲的亚马逊。

但它们不会在小企业界
产生同样程度的恐惧

原因之一

是他们
决定积极

投资非洲企业家

,让他们进入数字时代。

现在请记住,

Jumia 在世界
上一些数字素养

和数字连接
分数最低的国家/地区开展业务。

现在他们本可以

通过
游说改革来解决这个问题

——他们可能会这样做——

但他们还建立了 Jumia 大学,这

是一个电子学习平台

,商家可以来这里学习
基本的数字和商业技能。 去年

我们研究
了非洲的在线市场。

在那次研究中,
我们遇到了 Jumia 的一位商人。

他叫乔莫。

他在 2014 年被解雇

,当时,
他决定要成为自己的老板。

他想独立。

他还想永远不再被解雇。

所以那个时候,

乔莫根本不知道什么是生意。

所以他需要通过
一系列的培训

来学习如何选择产品、
如何定价

以及如何在线推广。

如今,Jomo 拥有 10 名员工的
在线业务。

就在几个月前,

他刚刚在内罗毕郊区开了他的第一
家实体店

现在,通过其大学,

Jumia 具有
帮助大量 Jomos 的潜力。

我们估计,与

非洲大陆的其他在线市场一起,到 2025 年,

它们可以创造 300 万个
额外的就业机会。

它们将直接

或通过
对更广泛社区的影响来实现这一目标。

有时,

考虑到更广泛的影响

或忘记它

可能会成就或破坏一个平台。

为了说明这一点,
让我们回到新加坡。

所以,当我们去年决定和我
妻子离开这个国家时,

优步也决定这样做。

与此同时

,我们再次开始看到这种模式,

但也许这是一个巧合。

事实上,优步
在叫车大战中

输给了马来西亚出生的初创公司 Grab。

现在,有趣的是,

我妻子对 Grab 并没有同样
程度的担忧,

因为 Grab 刚成立时,
它的名字不同。

它被称为 MyTeksi

,顾名思义,
它最初是一个出租车平台。

因此,当 Grab 开始将
司机池扩展到出租车之外时,

它被认为是渐进和合理的。

他们
在这样做时也非常小心。

他们想到了应该为所有司机带来什么样
的社会安全网

因此,他们制定了
特殊的保险计划

,甚至制定了金融教育计划。

现在,将其
与伦敦、纽约和巴黎发生的情况进行比较,在这些

地方,出租车司机并不
认为平台明白

他们必须为执照支付 200,000 欧元
——

而且大部分是贷款。

当你不考虑
这种社会环境信息时

你会得到强烈的反应。

我并不是要争辩

Grab、Jumia
或 Gojek 的权衡是没有风险的。

他们是否
在某个时候暂时放缓了增长?

或许。

但是今天看看他们。

Gojek 价值 100 亿美元。

Jumia 是整个非洲仅有的三只独角兽
之一。

而 Grab,他们将 Uber

推出了整个东南亚地区。

而且我还认为这些
权衡与新兴市场无关。

亚马逊、优步或其他公司
可以向他们学习,

并使他们适应自己的现实。

从长远来看,

这并不一定是一场零和游戏。

从长远来看

——这可能是我所说的亚洲
方面——

耐心是值得的。

根据一个更大的方程式重新考虑
您的目标和您的优先事项

是值得的

,其中当然包括您
和您的用户,

但也包括监管机构、

政策制定者和您的社区。

我认为,最重要的是,

它包括
您打算破坏的业务。

谢谢你。

(掌声)