How Netflix changed entertainment and where its headed Reed Hastings

Chris Anderson: I have been long
so fascinated and amazed

by so many aspects of Netflix.

You’re full of surprises, if I may say so.

One of those surprises happened,
I think about six years ago.

So, the company back then
was doing really well,

but you were basically a streaming service

for other people’s films and TV content.

You’d persuaded Wall Street
that you were right

to make the kind of radical shift
away from just sending people DVDs,

so you were doing it by streaming.

And you were growing like a weed –

you had more than six million subscribers
and healthy growth rates,

and yet, you chose that moment

to kind of make a giant –
really, a bet-the-company decision.

What was that decision,
and what motivated it?

Reed Hastings: Well,
cable networks from all time

have started on other people’s content

and then grown into doing
their own originals.

So we knew of the general idea
for quite a while.

And we had actually tried to get into
original content back in 2005,

when we were on DVD only
and buying films at Sundance –

Maggie Gyllenhaal, “Sherrybaby,”
we published on DVD –

we were a mini studio.

And it didn’t work out,
because we were subscale.

And then, as you said, in 2011,

Ted Sarandos, my partner at Netflix
who runs content,

got very excited about “House of Cards.”

And at that time,
it was 100 million dollars,

it was a fantastic investment,

and it was in competition with HBO.

And that was really the breakthrough,
that he picked right upfront.

CA: But that was a significant percentage
of the revenue of the company

at that time.

But how could you get confident
that that was actually worth doing?

If you got that wrong,

it might have been really
devastating for the company.

RH: Yeah, we weren’t confident.
I mean, that’s the whole tension of it.

We were like, “Holy …!” –
I can’t say that.

Yeah, it was scary.

(Laughter)

CA: And with that, it wasn’t just
producing new content.

You also, pretty much with that,
if I understand right,

introduced this idea of binge-viewing.

It wasn’t, “We’re going to do
these episodes and build excitement” –

boom! – all at one time.

And that consumer mode
hadn’t really been tested.

Why did you risk that?

RH: Well, you know,
we had grown up shipping DVDs.

And then there were series,
box sets, on DVD.

And all of us had that experience
watching some of the great HBO content

you know, with the DVD –
next episode, next episode.

And so that was the trigger
to make us think,

wow, you know, with episodic content,
especially serialized,

it’s so powerful to have
all the episodes at once.

And it’s something
that linear TV can’t do.

And so both of those
made it really positive.

CA: And so, did it work out on the math
pretty much straight away,

that an hour spent watching
“House of Cards,” say,

was more profitable to you

than an hour spent watching
someone else’s licensed content?

RH: You know, because we’re subscription,
we don’t have to track it at that level.

And so it’s really about
making the brand stronger,

so that more people want to join.

And “House of Cards” absolutely did that,

because then many people
would talk about it

and associate that brand with us,

whereas “Mad Men” we carried –
great show, AMC show –

but they didn’t associate it with Netflix,

even if they watched it on Netflix.

CA: And so you added
all these other remarkable series,

“Narcos,” “Jessica Jones,”
“Orange is the New Black,” “The Crown,”

“Black Mirror” – personal favorite –

“Stranger Things” and so on.

And so, this coming year,

the level of investment you’re planning
to make in new content

is not 100 million.

It’s what?

RH: It’s about eight billion dollars
around the world.

And it’s not enough.

There are so many great shows
on other networks.

And so we have a long way to go.

CA: But eight billion –

that’s pretty much higher than any other
content commissioner at this point?

RH: No, Disney is in that realm,

and if they’re able to acquire Fox,
they’re even bigger.

And then, really, that’s spread globally,

so it’s not as much as it sounds.

(Laughter)

CA: But clearly, from the Barry Dillers
and others in the media business,

it feels like from nowhere,

this company has come and has
really revolutionized the business.

It’s like, as if Blockbuster one day said,

“We’re going to make Blockbuster videos,”

and then, six years later,
was as big as Disney.

I mean, that story would never
have happened, and yet it did.

RH: That’s the bitch about the internet –
it moves fast, you know?

Everything around us moves really quick.

CA: I mean, there must be something
unusual about Netflix’s culture

that allowed you to take such
bold – I won’t say “reckless” –

bold, well thought-through decisions.

RH: Yeah, absolutely.

We did have one advantage,
which is we were born on DVD,

and we knew that that
was going to be temporary.

No one thought we’d be
mailing discs for 100 years.

So then you have a lot of paranoia
about what’s coming next,

and that’s part of the founding ethos,

is really worrying
about what’s coming next.

So that’s an advantage.

And then in terms of the culture,

it’s very big on freedom
and responsibility.

I pride myself on making as few decisions
as possible in a quarter.

And we’re getting better
and better at that.

There are some times
I can go a whole quarter

without making any decisions.

(Laughter)

(Applause)

CA: But there are some really
surprising things about your people.

For example, I looked at one survey.

It looks like Netflix employees,
compared to your peers',

are basically the highest paid
for equivalent jobs.

And the least likely to want to leave.

And if you Google
the Netflix culture deck,

you see this list of quite surprising
admonitions to your employees.

Talk about a few of them.

RH: Well, you know, my first company –
we were very process obsessed.

This was in the 1990s.

And every time someone made a mistake,

we tried to put a process in place

to make sure that mistake
didn’t happen again –

so, very semiconductor-yield orientation.

And the problem is, we were trying
to dummy-proof the system.

And then, eventually,
only dummies wanted to work there.

Then, of course, the market shifted –
in that case, it was C++ to Java.

But you know, there’s always some shift.

And the company was unable to adapt,

and it got acquired
by our largest competitor.

And so with Netflix, I was super focused
on how to run with no process

but not have chaos.

And so then we’ve developed
all these mechanisms,

super high-talented people, alignment,

talking openly, sharing information –

internally, people are stunned
at how much information –

all the core strategies, etc.

We’re like the “anti-Apple” –
you know how they compartmentalize?

We do the opposite, which is:
everybody gets all the information.

So what we’re trying to do is build
a sense of responsibility in people

and the ability to do things.

I find out about big decisions now
that are made all the time,

I’ve never even heard about it,
which is great.

And mostly, they go well.

CA: So you just wake up
and read them on the internet.

RH: Sometimes.

CA: “Oh, we just entered China!”

RH: Yeah, well that would be a big one.

CA: But you allow employees to set
their own vacation time, and …

There’s just –

RH: Sure, that’s a big
symbolic one, vacation,

because most people, in practice,
do that, anyway.

But yeah, there’s a whole lot
of that freedom.

CA: And courage, you ask for
as a fundamental value.

RH: Yeah, we want people
to speak the truth.

And we say, “To disagree
silently is disloyal.”

It’s not OK to let some decision
go through without saying your piece,

and typically, writing it down.

And so we’re very focused
on trying to get to good decisions

through the debate that always happens.

And we try not to make it intense,
like yelling at each other –

nothing like that.

You know, it’s really curiosity
drawing people out.

CA: You’ve got this other
secret weapon at Netflix, it seems,

which is this vast trove of data,

a word we’ve heard
a certain amount about this week.

You’ve often taken
really surprising stances

towards building smart
algorithms at Netflix.

Back in the day, you opened up
your algorithm to the world

and said, “Hey, can anyone do better
than this recommendation we’ve got?

If so, we’ll pay you a million dollars.”

You paid someone a million dollars,

because it was like 10 percent
better than yours.

RH: That’s right.

CA: Was that a good decision?
Would you do that again?

RH: Yeah, it was super exciting
at the time; this was about 2007.

But you know, we haven’t done it again.

So clearly, it’s a very specialized tool.

And so think of that as
a lucky break of good timing,

rather than a general framework.

So what we’ve done is invest a lot
on the algorithms,

so that we feature the right content
to the right people

and try to make it fun
and easy to explore.

CA: And you made this, what seems
like a really interesting shift,

a few years ago.

You used to ask people,
“Here are 10 movies. What do you think?

Which ones of these
are your best movies?”

And then tried to match those movies
with recommendations for what was coming.

And then you changed away from that.

Talk about that.

RH: Sure.

Everyone would rate
“Schindler’s List” five stars,

and then they’d rate Adam Sandler,
“The Do-Over” three stars.

But, in fact, when you looked
at what they watched,

it was almost always Adam Sandler.

And so what happens is, when we rate
and we’re metacognitive about quality,

that’s sort of our aspirational self.

And it works out much better
to please people

to look at the actual choices
that they make,

their revealed preferences
by how much they enjoy simple pleasures.

CA: OK, I want to talk
for a couple of minutes about this,

because this strikes me as a huge deal,
not just for Netflix,

for the internet as a whole.

The difference between aspirational values

and revealed values.

You, brilliantly, didn’t pay too much
attention to what people said,

you watched what they did,
and then found the stuff that,

“Oh my God, I never knew I would like
a show about making horrible recipes,

called ‘Nailed It!'”

RH: Called “Nailed It!” Right.

CA: It’s hilarious. I would never
have even thought of that.

But aren’t there risks with this,

if this go-only-with-revealed-values
approach is taken too far?

RH: Well, we get a lot of joy
from making people happy,

Sometimes you just want to relax
and watch a show like “Nailed It!”

And it’s fun, and it’s not stressful.

Other times, people want
to watch very intensive film.

“Mudbound” was Oscar-nominated,

it’s a great, very intensive film.

And you know, we’ve had over
20 million hours of viewing on “Mudbound,”

which is dramatically bigger
than it would have been in the theaters

or any other distribution.

And so, we have some candy, too,
but we have lots of broccoli.

And you know, if you have the good mix,
you get to a healthy diet.

CA: But – yes, indeed.

But isn’t it the case that algorithms
tend to point you away from the broccoli

and towards the candy,

if you’re not careful?

We just had a talk about how,
on YouTube, somehow algorithms

tend to, just by actually being smarter,

tend to drive people towards
more radical or specific content.

It’d be easy to imagine
that Netflix algorithms,

just going on revealed values,
would gradually –

RH: Right, get too base –

CA: We’d all be watching
violent pornography or something.

Or some people would, you know.

But, how –

(Laughter)

Not me!

I’m the child of a missionary,
I don’t even think about these things.

But –

(Laughter)

But I mean, it’s possible, right?

RH: In practice, you’re right
that you can’t just rely on algorithms.

It’s a mix of judgment and what we carry,

and we’re a curated service

versus a platform
like Facebook and YouTube,

so we have an easier set of issues,

which is: What are these great
films and series that we acquire?

But then within that,
the algorithm is a tool.

CA: But how – John Doerr just talked
about measuring what matters.

As a business, what matters, I presume,

is fundamentally just growing subscribers.

I mean, that’s your unique advantage.

Are subscribers grown only by
the more time they spend watching Netflix,

that is what will make them re-subscribe?

Or is it even more about having shows

that might not have been so much time

as watching the whole season
of “Nailed It!” or whatever?

But just get into them more;
they just think,

“That was nourishing,
that was extraordinary,

I’m so glad I watched
that with my family.”

Isn’t there a version
of the business model

that would be less content
but more awesome content,

possibly even more uplifting content?

RH: And people choose
that uplifting content.

I think you’re right, which is,
when people talk about Netflix,

they talk about the shows that move them:

“13 Reasons Why” or “The Crown.”

And that is way disproportionate
and positive impact,

even for the subscriber growth
that you talked about

is those couple big, memorable shows.

But what we want to do is offer a variety.

You don’t want to watch the same thing
every night, as much as you like it;

you want to try different things.

And what we haven’t seen is this, say,

race to the bottom of your
violent pornography kind of examples.

Instead, we’ve seen great viewing
across a whole range –

“Black Mirror” –
we’re filming season five now.

And that was a struggling show
when it was only in the BBC.

And with the distribution of on-demand,

you can make these much bigger shows.

CA: You’re telling me
humans can get addicted

by their angels as well as their demons.

RH: Yeah, and again, we try
not to think about it in addiction terms,

we think about it as, you know:

What are you going to do
with your time and when you want to relax?

You can watch linear TV, you can do
video games, you can do YouTube,

or you can watch Netflix.

And if we’re as great as we can be,
and we have a variety of moods,

then more often, people will choose us.

CA: But you have people
in the organization

who are looking regularly
at the actual impacts

of these brilliant algorithms
that you’ve created.

Just for reality check, just,

“Are we sure that this
is the direction we want to go?”

RH: You know, I think we learn.

And you have to be humble and sort of say,
“Look, there’s no perfect tool.”

The algorithm’s one part,
the way we commission the content,

our relationships with societies.

So there’s a lot of ways
that we have to look at it.

So if you get too stuck in
“Let’s just increase viewing”

or “Just increase subscribers,”

you’re unlikely to be able to grow
and be the great company you want to be.

So think of it as this
multiple measures of success.

CA: So, speaking of algorithms
that have raised questions:

You were on the board of Facebook,

and I think Mark Zuckerberg –
you’ve done some mentoring for him.

What should we know about Mark Zuckerberg
that people don’t know?

RH: Well, many of you know him
or have seen him.

I mean, he’s a fantastic human being.

Really first-class.

And social – these platforms,
whether that’s YouTube or Facebook,

are clearly trying to grow up quickly.

And we see that with all new technologies.

I mean, yesterday we were talking
about printed DNA,

and it’s like: could be fantastic
or could be horrific.

And you know, all new technologies –

when television was first popular
in the 1960s in the US,

it was called a “vast wasteland,”

and that television was going to rot
the minds of everybody.

It turns out everybody’s minds were fine.

And there were some adjustments,

but think of it as –
or, I think of it as –

all new technologies have pros and cons.

And in social,
we’re just figuring that out.

CA: How much of a priority
is it for the board of Facebook

to really address some of the issues?

Or is the belief that, actually,

the company has been completely
unfairly criticized?

RH: Oh, it’s not completely unfairly.

And Mark’s leading the charge
on fixing Facebook.

And he’s very passionate about that.

CA: Reed, I want to look
at another passion of yours.

I mean, you’ve done incredibly well
with Netflix, you’re a billionaire,

and you spend a lot of time
and indeed, money, on education.

RH: Yep.

CA: Why is this a passion,
and what are you doing about it?

RH: Sure. Right out of college,
I was a high school math teacher.

So when I later went into business
and became a philanthropist,

I think I gravitated towards education

and trying to make a difference there.

And the main thing I noticed is, you know,

educators want to work
with other great educators

and to create many
unique environments for kids.

And we need a lot more
variety in the system

than we have,

and a lot more
educator-centric organizations.

And so the tricky thing is,
right now in the US,

most schools are run
by a local school board.

And it has to meet all needs
in the community,

and, in fact, what we need
is a lot more variety.

So in the US there’s a form
of public school

called charter public schools,
that are run by nonprofits.

And that’s the big emphasis for me,

is if you can have schools
run by nonprofits,

they are more mission-focused,
they support the educators well.

I’m on the board of KIPP charter schools,

which is one of the larger networks.

And, you know, it’s 30,000 kids a year
getting very stimulating education.

CA: Paint me a picture of what
a school should look like.

RH: It depends on the kid.

Think about it as: with multiple
kids, there’s all different needs

that need to be met,

so there’s not any one model.

And you want to be able to choose,

depending on your kid
and what you think they need.

But they should be very educator-centric
and curious and stimulating

and all of those things.

And this whole idea
of 30 kids in fifth grade,

all learning the same thing
at the same time,

you know, is clearly
an industrial throwback.

But changing that, given
the current government structure,

is super hard.

But what these innovative, nonprofit
schools are doing is pushing the bounds,

letting kids try new things.

And so think of it as
the governance reform,

that is, the nonprofit,

to allow the educational changes.

CA: And sometimes the criticism is put
that charter schools,

intentionally or unintentionally,

suck resources away
from the public school system.

Should we be concerned about that?

RH: Well, they are public schools.

I mean, there’s these multiple types
of public schools.

And if you look at charters as a whole,

they serve low-income kids.

Because if high-income kids
get in trouble,

the parents will send them
to a private school

or they move neighborhoods.

And low-income families generally
don’t have those choices.

Like KIPP – it’s 80 percent
low-income kids, free and reduced lunch.

And the college admissions
for KIPP is fantastic.

CA: Reed, you signed
the Giving Pledge a few years ago,

you’re committed to giving away
more than half of your fortune

during your lifetime.

Can I cheekily ask how much
you’ve invested in education

in the last few years?

RH: It’s a couple hundred million,
I don’t know exactly how many hundreds,

but we’re continuing to invest and –

(Applause)

thank you all –

(Applause)

You know, honestly, for a little while
I tried to do politics full-time,

working for John Doerr.

And while I loved working for John,
I just didn’t thrive on politics.

I love business, I love competing.

I love going up against Disney and HBO.

(Laughter)

That’s what gets me going.

And now I do that to really
increase Netflix’s value,

which allows me to write
more checks to schools.

And so for now, it’s the perfect life.

CA: Reed, you’re a remarkable person,
you’ve changed all of our lives

and the lives of many kids.

Thank you so much for coming to TED.

(Applause)

克里斯安德森:长期以来,我一直

对 Netflix 的许多方面如此着迷和惊讶。

如果我可以这么说,你充满了惊喜。

其中一个惊喜发生了,
我想大约是在六年前。

所以,当时的公司
做得很好,

但你基本上是

为别人的电影和电视内容提供流媒体服务。

你说服了华尔街
,你

做出
了从仅仅向人们发送 DVD 的彻底转变是正确的,

所以你是通过流媒体来做到这一点的。

你像杂草一样成长——

你拥有超过 600 万订阅者
和健康的增长率

,然而,你选择了那个时刻

来做一个巨人——
真的,一个赌公司的决定。

这个决定是什么,是
什么动机?

里德·黑斯廷斯:嗯,
有线电视网络一直以来

都是从其他人的内容开始的

,然后发展成
自己的原创节目。

所以我们很长一段时间都知道这个总体
思路。

事实上,我们早在 2005 年就曾尝试过制作
原创内容,

当时我们只制作 DVD
并在圣丹斯购买电影——

玛吉·吉伦哈尔 (Maggie Gyllenhaal),
我们在 DVD 上发行的“雪莉宝贝”——

我们是一个迷你工作室。

它没有成功,
因为我们是次规模的。

然后,正如您所说,在 2011 年

,我在 Netflix 负责内容运营的合伙人泰德·萨兰多斯(Ted Sarandos)

对《纸牌屋》感到非常兴奋。

而且
当时是1亿美元

,是一笔了不起的投资,

和HBO竞争。

这真的是突破
,他一开始就选择了。

CA:但那是当时
公司收入的很大一部分

但是你怎么能
确信这实际上是值得做的呢?

如果你弄错了,

这对公司来说可能真的是
毁灭性的。

RH:是的,我们没有信心。
我的意思是,这就是它的全部张力。

我们就像,“神圣的……!” ——
我不能这么说。

是的,这很可怕。

(笑声)

CA:有了它,它不仅仅是
制作新的内容。

如果我理解正确的话,你也

差不多这样介绍了这种暴饮暴食的想法。

不是,“我们要做
这些剧集并制造兴奋”——

轰! ——一次全部。

而且这种消费者模式
还没有真正经过测试。

你为什么冒这个险?

RH:嗯,你知道,
我们从小就运送 DVD。

然后是
DVD 上的系列、盒装。

我们所有人都曾通过 DVD
观看过一些你知道的 HBO 精彩内容

——
下一集,下一集。

所以这就是
让我们思考的触发因素,

哇,你知道,对于剧集内容,
尤其是连载的

,一次拥有所有剧集是如此强大


是线性电视无法做到的。

所以这两个
都让它变得非常积极。

CA:那么,从数学上

说,花一个小时看
“纸牌屋”

比花一个小时看
别人的授权内容更能赚钱吗?

RH:你知道,因为我们是订阅,
我们不必在那个级别跟踪它。

所以这真的是为了
让品牌更强大,

让更多的人想要加入。

而《纸牌屋》绝对做到了,

因为那时很多人
会谈论它

并将那个品牌与我们联系起来,而我们推出的

《广告狂人》——
很棒的节目,AMC 节目——

但他们并没有把它与 Netflix 联系起来 ,

即使他们是在 Netflix 上观看的。

CA:所以你添加了
所有其他非凡的系列,

“毒枭”、“杰西卡·琼斯”、
“橙色是新的黑色”、“王冠”、

“黑镜”——个人最喜欢的——

“怪奇物语”等等 在。

因此,来年

,您
计划在新内容

上的投资水平不是 1 亿。

它是什么?

RH:全世界大约有 80 亿美元

这还不够。 其他网络上

有很多精彩的节目

所以我们还有很长的路要走。

CA:但是 80 亿——

在这一点上,这比任何其他内容专员都要高得多?

RH:不,迪士尼在那个领域

,如果他们能够收购福克斯,
他们会更大。

然后,真的,这在全球范围内传播,

所以它并不像听起来那么多。

(笑声)

CA:但显然,从 Barry Dillers
和媒体行业的其他人

看来,

这家公司不知从何而来,并且
真正彻底改变了行业。

就好像百视达有一天说,

“我们要制作百视达视频”

,然后,六年后
,它和迪斯尼一样大。

我的意思是,那个故事永远
不会发生,但它确实发生了。

RH:这就是互联网的婊子——
它移动得很快,你知道吗?

我们周围的一切都移动得非常快。

CA:我的意思是,
Netflix 的文化一定有什么不同寻常的地方

让你做出如此
大胆的——我不会说“鲁莽”——

大胆、深思熟虑的决定。

RH:是的,绝对的。

我们确实有一个优势,
那就是我们出生在 DVD 上

,我们知道
这将是暂时的。

没有人认为我们会
邮寄光盘 100 年。

所以你对接下来会发生什么有很多偏执

,这是创始精神的一部分

,真的很
担心接下来会发生什么。

所以这是一个优势。

然后就文化而言,

它非常重视自由
和责任。

我为自己在一个季度内做出尽可能少的决定而感到自豪

我们
在这方面做得越来越好。

有时
我可以在

不做任何决定的情况下完成整个季度。

(笑声)

(掌声)

CA:但是
你们的人有一些非常令人惊讶的事情。

例如,我查看了一项调查。

看起来 Netflix 员工
与您的同行相比

,基本上
是同等工作中薪酬最高的。

并且最不可能想要离开。

如果你
在 Netflix 文化平台上谷歌,

你会看到这份
对你的员工非常令人惊讶的告诫列表。

谈谈其中的几个。

RH:嗯,你知道,我的第一家公司——
我们非常痴迷于流程。

这是在 1990 年代。

每次有人犯错时,

我们都会尝试制定一个流程,

以确保该错误
不会再次发生——

因此,非常注重半导体产量。

问题是,我们试图
对系统进行虚拟验证。

然后,最终,
只有傻瓜想在那里工作。

然后,当然,市场发生了变化——
在这种情况下,是从 C++ 到 Java。

但你知道,总有一些转变。

公司无法适应,

被我们最大的竞争对手收购。

因此,对于 Netflix,我非常专注
于如何在没有流程的情况下运行,

但又不会造成混乱。

因此,我们开发了
所有这些机制,

超高人才、结盟、

公开交谈、共享信息——在

内部,人们对信息量感到震惊
——

所有核心策略等等。

我们就像“ 反苹果”——
你知道他们是如何划分的吗?

我们做相反的事情,那就是:
每个人都得到所有的信息。

所以我们正在努力做的是建立
人们的责任感

和做事的能力。

我发现现在一直
在做出重大决定,

我什至从未听说过,
这很棒。

大多数情况下,他们进展顺利。

CA:所以你只需醒来
并在互联网上阅读它们。

RH:有时。

CA:“哦,我们刚进入中国!”

RH:是的,那将是一件大事。

CA:但是你允许员工设定
他们自己的休假时间,而且……

RH:当然,这是一个很大的
象征性假期,假期

,因为实际上大多数人
都会这样做。

但是,是的,有
很多自由。

CA:勇气,你
要求的基本价值。

RH:是的,我们希望
人们说实话。

我们说,“
默默地不同意是不忠的。”

不说你的文章就让某个决定通过是不行的

,通常情况下,把它写下来。

因此,我们非常专注
于尝试

通过经常发生的辩论做出正确的决定。

我们尽量不让它变得激烈,
比如互相大喊大叫——绝不是

那样。

你知道,真正
吸引人们的是好奇心。

CA:你
似乎在 Netflix 拥有了另一个秘密武器,

那就是海量数据,

这个词我们本周已经听到
了一定数量的词。 在 Netflix 构建智能算法时,

您经常采取
非常令人惊讶的立场

过去,你
向全世界公开了你的算法

并说:“嘿,谁能
比我们的推荐做得更好?

如果是这样,我们会付给你一百万美元。”

你付给某人一百万美元,

因为它
比你的好 10%。

RH:没错。

CA:这是一个好的决定吗?
你会再这样做吗?

RH:是的,当时非常令人兴奋
。 这大约是 2007 年。

但你知道,我们没有再这样做过。

很明显,这是一个非常专业的工具。

所以认为这是
一个很好的时机,

而不是一个通用的框架。

所以我们所做的就是
在算法上进行大量投资,

以便我们
为正确的人提供正确的内容,

并努力让它变得有趣
且易于探索。

CA:几年前,你做出了这个
,看起来非常有趣的转变

你曾经问人们,
“这里有 10 部电影。你觉得怎么样?

其中哪些
是你最好的电影?”

然后尝试将这些电影
与即将发生的事情的建议相匹配。

然后你改变了。

谈论那个。

RH:当然。

每个人都会给
“辛德勒的名单”打五颗星,

然后他们会给亚当桑德勒的
“重头戏”打三颗星。

但事实上,当你
看到他们观看的内容时,

几乎总是亚当·桑德勒。

所以发生的事情是,当我们
对质量进行评分并且我们对质量有元认知时,

这就是我们的理想自我。

取悦人们看他们
做出

的实际选择

他们所揭示的偏好
,以及他们享受简单快乐的程度,效果会更好。

CA:好的,我想
谈一谈这个问题,

因为这对我来说意义重大,
不仅对 Netflix 而言,

对整个互联网而言。

抱负价值

和揭示价值之间的差异。

你,太棒了,没有太
在意人们说什么,

你看了他们做了什么,
然后发现,

“哦,我的上帝,我从来不知道我会喜欢
一个关于制作可怕食谱的节目,

叫做‘钉子 它!'”

RH:被称为“钉住它!” 对。

CA:这很有趣。 我
什至不会想到这一点。

但是,

如果这种只使用显示值的
方法走得太远,是否存在风险?

RH:嗯,我们
从让人们快乐中获得了很多快乐,

有时你只是想放松一下
,看看像“Nailed It!”这样的节目。

这很有趣,而且没有压力。

其他时候,人们
想看非常密集的电影。

《泥泞》获得了奥斯卡提名,

这是一部很棒的电影。

你知道,我们
在“泥界”上的观看时间已超过 2000 万小时,


比在影院

或任何其他发行版中的观看时间要大得多。

所以,我们也有一些糖果,
但我们有很多西兰花。

你知道,如果你有很好的组合,
你就会得到健康的饮食。

CA:但是——是的,确实如此。

但是,如果您不小心的话,算法是否
倾向于将您从西兰花

引向糖果

我们刚刚
在 YouTube 上讨论过,算法如何以某种方式

趋向于,仅仅通过实际上变得更聪明,

趋向于驱使人们转向
更激进或更具体的内容。

很容易想象
,Netflix 的算法,

只是继续揭示价值,
会逐渐–

RH:对,太低级了–

CA:我们都会看
暴力色情或其他东西。

或者有些人会,你知道的。

但是,怎么——

(笑声)

不是我!

我是传教士的孩子,
我什至不考虑这些事情。

但是——

(笑声)

但我的意思是,这是可能的,对吧?

RH:在实践中,你是对的
,你不能只依赖算法。

这是判断力和我们携带的东西的混合体,

相对于
Facebook 和 YouTube 等平台,我们是一个策划服务,

所以我们有一组更简单的问题,

即:我们获得的这些伟大的
电影和系列是什么?

但在其中
,算法是一种工具。

CA:但是如何——John Doerr 刚刚
谈到衡量什么是重要的。

我认为,作为一家企业,重要的

是从根本上增加订户。

我的意思是,这是你独特的优势。

订阅者是否会
随着观看 Netflix 的时间越长而增加,

这就是他们重新订阅的原因?

或者更多的是关于观看

可能没有那么多时间的节目,

因为观看整个赛季
的“Nailed It!” 管他呢?

但是更多地进入它们;
他们只是想,

“那是滋养的,
那是非凡的,

我很高兴能
和家人一起观看。”

是不是有一个版本
的商业

模式会更少内容
但更精彩的内容,

甚至可能更令人振奋的内容?

RH:人们会选择
那些令人振奋的内容。

我认为你是对的,也就是说,
当人们谈论 Netflix 时,

他们会谈论让他们感动的节目:

“13 个原因”或“王冠”。

这就是不成比例
的积极影响,

即使你谈到的订阅者增长

是那些令人难忘的大型节目。

但我们想做的是提供多样化。

你不想每晚都看同样的东西
,只要你喜欢它;

你想尝试不同的东西。

而我们没有看到的是,比如说,

在你的
暴力色情类例子中追根究底。

取而代之的是,我们在整个范围内都看到了很棒的收视率
——

“黑镜”——
我们现在正在拍摄第五季。

当它只出现在 BBC 时,那是一场苦苦挣扎的节目。

通过按需分发,

您可以制作这些更大的节目。

CA:你告诉我
人类会

被他们的天使和恶魔上瘾。

RH:是的,再一次,我们尽量
不从成瘾的角度来考虑它,

我们认为它是,你知道的:

你打算做什么,什么
时候想放松?

你可以看线性电视,可以玩
电子游戏,可以玩 YouTube,

也可以看 Netflix。

如果我们尽我们所能,
并且我们有各种各样的情绪,

那么更多时候,人们会选择我们。

CA:但是您
组织中的

人员会定期查看您创建

的这些出色算法
的实际影响。

只是为了现实检查,只是,

“我们确定这
是我们想要去的方向吗?”

RH:你知道,我认为我们学习了。

你必须谦虚地说,
“看,没有完美的工具。”

算法的一部分,
我们委托内容的方式,

我们与社会的关系。

所以我们有很多方法
可以看待它。

因此,如果您过于拘泥于
“让我们增加观看次数”

或“只增加订阅者”,

那么您就不太可能成长
并成为您想成为的伟大公司。

因此,将其视为
成功的多种衡量标准。

CA:所以,谈到
引发问题的算法:

你是 Facebook 的董事会成员

,我认为马克扎克伯格——
你为他做了一些指导。

我们应该
知道人们不知道的马克扎克伯格什么?

RH:嗯,你们中的许多人都认识
或见过他。

我的意思是,他是一个了不起的人。

真是一流。

还有社交——这些平台,
无论是 YouTube 还是 Facebook

,显然都在努力快速成长。

我们在所有新技术中都看到了这一点。

我的意思是,昨天我们谈论的
是印刷 DNA

,就像:可能很棒
,也可能很可怕。

你知道,所有的新技术——

当电视
在 1960 年代在美国首次流行时,

它被称为“广阔的荒地”

,电视会腐烂
每个人的思想。

事实证明,每个人的心都很好。

并且进行了一些调整,

但将其视为 -
或者,我认为是 -

所有新技术都有优点和缺点。

在社交方面,
我们只是在弄清楚这一点。

CA:
Facebook 董事会

真正解决一些问题的优先级有多大?

还是认为

公司实际上受到了完全
不公平的批评?

RH:哦,这并不完全不公平。

马克
负责修复 Facebook。

他对此非常热衷。

CA:里德,我想
看看你的另一种热情。

我的意思是,你在 Netflix 上做得非常好
,你是亿万富翁,

而且你在教育上花费了很多时间
,甚至是金钱。

RH:是的。

CA:为什么这是一种激情
,你在做什么呢?

RH:当然。 刚从大学毕业,
我就是一名高中数学老师。

因此,当我后来经商
并成为慈善家时,

我想我被教育所吸引,

并试图在那里有所作为。

我注意到的主要事情是,你知道,

教育工作者希望
与其他伟大的教育工作者合作,


为孩子们创造许多独特的环境。

我们需要比我们拥有
的系统更多的多样性

以及更多以
教育者为中心的组织。

所以棘手的是,
现在在美国,

大多数学校都是
由当地的学校董事会管理的。

它必须满足
社区的所有需求

,事实上,我们需要的
是更多种类。

所以在美国有
一种公立学校,

叫做特许公立学校
,由非营利组织经营。

这对我来说是一个很大的重点,

如果你可以让
非营利组织经营学校,

他们更注重使命,
他们很好地支持教育工作者。

我是 KIPP 特许学校的董事会成员,

这是较大的网络之一。

而且,你知道,每年有 30,000 名孩子
接受非常刺激的教育。

CA:给我画
一张学校应该是什么样子的照片。

RH:这取决于孩子。

把它想象成:有多个
孩子,需要满足所有不同的需求

所以没有任何一种模式。

而且您希望能够

根据您的孩子
以及您认为他们需要什么来进行选择。

但他们应该非常以教育者为中心
,充满好奇和刺激,

以及所有这些。

五年级的 30 个孩子,

同时学习同样的东西

你知道的,这整个想法显然
是一种工业倒退。


鉴于目前的政府结构,改变这

一点非常困难。

但这些创新的非营利性
学校正在做的是突破界限,

让孩子们尝试新事物。

因此,可以将其
视为治理改革

,即非营利组织,

以允许教育变革。

CA:有时
有人批评特许学校

有意或无意地

从公立学校系统中吸走资源。

我们应该为此担心吗?

RH:嗯,他们是公立学校。

我的意思是,有多种类型
的公立学校。

如果你把包机作为一个整体来看,

它们服务于低收入的孩子。

因为如果高收入的孩子
遇到麻烦

,父母会把他们
送到私立学校

或者搬家。

而低收入家庭通常
没有这些选择。

像 KIPP 一样——它是 80%
的低收入儿童,免费和减价午餐。

KIPP 的大学
录取非常棒。

CA:里德,你
在几年前签署了捐赠誓言,

你承诺

在你的一生中捐出一半以上的财富。

我可以厚颜无耻地问
你过去几年在教育方面投入了多少

RH:
几亿,我不知道具体有多少,

但我们会继续投资,而且–

(掌声)

谢谢大家–

(掌声

)老实说,有一段时间
我试过了 全职从政,

为 John Doerr 工作。

虽然我喜欢为约翰工作,但
我并没有在政治上茁壮成长。

我爱商业,我爱竞争。

我喜欢对抗迪士尼和 HBO。

(笑声)

这就是我前进的动力。

现在我这样做是为了真正
增加 Netflix 的价值,

这让我可以
给学校开更多的支票。

所以现在,这是完美的生活。

CA:里德,你是一个了不起的人,
你改变了我们所有人

以及许多孩子的生活。

非常感谢你来到 TED。

(掌声)