Inside the minds of animals Bryan B Rasmussen

Your dog loves to curl up on the couch,
but so do you,

so you shoo him off
and settle in for a cozy evening.

After all, you’re the human around here.

You’re an intelligent being,
not a simple creature of instinct.

You can plan and dream, and oh-

Did your dog just outsmart you
and feel happy about it?

Or was he just following his instincts?

Is there even a difference?

What is he thinking?

Well, it depends on
what we mean by “thinking”

and the criteria we use to evaluate it.

Aristotle and Descartes both use
the criteria of instinct and intelligence

to divide animals from humans.

Aristotle believed
that humans possess reason,

while animals could only follow brute
instincts for survival and reproduction.

Almost 2000 years later,

Descartes suggested
a more extreme version of that idea,

arguing that animals following instincts
were indistinguishable

from robots responding mechanically
to stimuli in their environments.

But the consensus against animal
intelligence began to unravel

with Darwin’s Theory of Evolution.

Darwin hypothesized that intelligence
could evolve from simpler instincts.

He had observed earthworms making choices
about how to drag oddly shaped leaves

into their boroughs,

and was struck that a human might employ
similar means to solve a similar problem.

And if, as he thought, humans
are descended from simpler creatures,

then perhaps our minds lie
at the far end of a continuum,

differing from theirs in degree,
but not in kind.

Recent experiments showing that many
species can solve complex problems

confirm Darwin’s initial hypothesis.

Elephants use objects to reach
inaccessible places.

Crows make their own tools,

and can use water displacement
to get a reward.

Octopuses can open jars
after watching others do so,

and can even remember
the process months later.

Such tasks involve considering
aspects of a problem

separately from the immediate situation,
and retaining the strategy for later use.

Still, while animals
can solve complex problems,

how do we know what, or even that,
they are thinking?

Behaviorists, such as Pavlov
and Thorndike, argue

that animals that appear to think

are usually only responding
to reward or punishment.

This was the case with Clever Hans,

a horse with the amazing ability
to tap out answers to math problems.

But it turns out Hans
wasn’t especially good at math,

but at reading his unwitting
trainer’s subtle nonverbal cues

for when to stop tapping.

So Hans couldn’t count,
but does that mean he wasn’t thinking?

After all, he could interpret
nuanced social messages,

a quality he shared with many other
non-human animals.

Elephants recognize each other
after years apart,

and even seem to mourn their dead.

Bees communicate
using a special waggle dance

to indicate the location and quality
of a food source to other bees.

Chimpanzees engage
in complex deception schemes,

suggesting not only do they think,
but they understand that others do, too.

And then there is Alex the Grey Parrot,

who could use human language

to distinguish the colors
and shapes of absent objects,

and even understand abstract concepts,
like bigger and smaller.

That sounds a lot like intelligence,

and not just the work
of mindless machines.

But while a non-human animal can solve
problems and even communicate,

for humans, thinking
also involves consciousness,

the ability to reflect on our actions,
not simply to perform them.

So far, none of our studies tell us
if having the intelligence to outsmart us

means that our dog
can also feel good about doing so.

What we really want to know is
what is it like to be a dog,

or an octopus,

or a crow?

Philosophers of mind call this
The Hard Problem,

because while you and I can report
what it feels like to be a human,

nobody speaks horse.

Even a talking parrot, like Alex,

couldn’t tell us how he feels
about the colors he could name.

And what if consciousness
comes in different forms?

Would we even recognize
the consciousness of bees?

For that matter, how can we know for sure
that other people have consciouness?

Perhaps they’re just
well-functioning zombies.

Regardless, animal minds continue to test
the limits of our understanding

and how we frame them may reveal more
about our minds than theirs.

你的狗喜欢蜷缩在沙发上,
但你也喜欢,

所以你把它赶走
,安顿下来度过一个舒适的夜晚。

毕竟,你是这里的人。

你是一个聪明的人,
而不是一个简单的本能生物。

您可以计划和梦想,哦-

您的狗只是比您聪明
并为此感到高兴吗?

还是他只是按照自己的直觉行事?

甚至有区别吗?

他在想什么?

好吧,这取决于
我们所说的“思考”是什么意思

以及我们用来评估它的标准。

亚里士多德和笛卡尔都使用
本能和智力的标准

来区分动物和人类。

亚里士多德认为
,人类拥有理性,

而动物只能遵循野蛮的
本能生存和繁殖。

大约 2000 年后,

笛卡尔提出
了这个想法的一个更极端的版本,

认为遵循本能的动物

机械
地对环境中的刺激作出反应的机器人没有区别。

但是反对动物智力的共识
开始

随着达尔文的进化论而瓦解。

达尔文假设智力
可以从简单的本能进化而来。

他观察到蚯蚓
如何选择如何将形状奇特的叶子

拖到它们的区域中,

并惊讶于人类可能会采用
类似的方法来解决类似的问题。

如果,如他所想,人类
是从更简单的生物进化而来的,

那么我们的心智或许
处于一个连续统一体的远端,

在程度上与他们的不同,
但在种类上却不同。

最近的实验表明,许多
物种可以解决复杂的问题,这

证实了达尔文的最初假设。

大象使用物体到达
人迹罕至的地方。

乌鸦自己制造工具

,可以利用水的置换
来获得奖励。

章鱼可以
在看到别人打开罐子后打开

罐子,甚至
几个月后还能记住这个过程。

此类任务涉及将
问题的各个方面

与当前情况分开考虑,
并保留策略以供以后使用。

尽管如此,虽然动物
可以解决复杂的问题,

但我们怎么知道它们在想什么,甚至是那个

行为主义者,如巴甫洛夫
和桑代克,

认为似乎会思考的动物

通常只会
对奖励或惩罚做出反应。

聪明的汉斯就是这种情况

,这匹马具有惊人的
数学问题答案能力。

但事实证明,汉斯
并不是特别擅长数学,

而是善于阅读他不知情的
教练关于何时停止敲击的微妙的非语言暗示

所以汉斯无法数数,
但这是否意味着他没有在思考?

毕竟,他可以解读
微妙的社会信息,这

是他与许多其他
非人类动物共有的品质。

大象
在相隔多年后彼此相认,

甚至似乎在哀悼他们的死者。

蜜蜂
使用特殊的摇摆舞

进行交流
,以向其他蜜蜂指示食物来源的位置和质量。

黑猩猩
参与复杂的欺骗计划,

这表明它们不仅会思考,
而且会理解其他人也会这样做。

然后是灰鹦鹉亚历克斯,

他可以使用人类语言

来区分
缺失物体的颜色和形状,

甚至可以理解抽象概念,
比如更大和更小。

这听起来很像智能,

而不仅仅是
无意识机器的工作。

但是,虽然非人类动物可以解决
问题甚至交流,但

对于人类来说,思维
还涉及意识,

即反思我们行为的能力,
而不仅仅是执行它们。

到目前为止,我们的研究都没有告诉
我们,拥有比我们更聪明的智力是否

意味着我们的狗
也会因此而感觉良好。

我们真正想知道的是
,做一只狗、

章鱼

或乌鸦是什么感觉?

有思想的哲学家将此称为
难题,

因为虽然你和我可以报告
作为人类的感觉,但

没有人会说马。

即使是像亚历克斯这样会说话的鹦鹉,

也无法告诉我们他对
自己能说出的颜色的感受。

如果
意识以不同的形式出现呢?

我们甚至会认出
蜜蜂的意识吗?

那么,我们怎么能
确定别人有意识呢?

也许他们只是
运作良好的僵尸。

无论如何,动物的思维继续测试
我们理解的极限,

以及我们如何构建它们可能会
比它们更能揭示我们的思维。