Five Key Lessons from the Pandemic

Transcriber: Ivy Jin
Reviewer: Lucas Kaimaras

Hi, I’m Doug Greenig
from Florin Court Capital.

My talk is called:

Lessons from the Pandemic -
Five things you need to know now.

Are you suffering from COVID fatigue?
A lot of us are.

Of course, it could be that you have
COVID, no wonder you’re so fatigued,

but it’s more likely that you’re exhausted

by the daily inundation of virus news.

So have no fear,
this talk is not actually about COVID.

It’s about how to make better
decisions under pressure.

And decision making in the real world
is a tricky business.

Almost every decision is easy
if you have enough information,

but many times,
we have limited information,

we have time pressure,

which makes decision making
a branch of risk management.

My background is as a mathematician,

I studied Differential Topology Dynamics
and Chaos Theory at Berkeley,

where I got my doctorate.

But I also have
a long background in biology.

I’ve been a trader, portfolio manager
and risk manager for 30 years,

and now I run a macro hedge fund,

and a key aspect of my work
-maybe the most key aspect-

is trying to make consequential decisions
under a lot of uncertainty,

And we happen to have
a very good case study to hand.

I first learned about this virus
around this time last year,

and I saw a paper in The Lancet
in late January.

Title was: A Novel Coronavirus Outbreak
of Global Health Concern.

That was January 24th.

This paper was done
by some Chinese doctors,

and they talked about a cluster
of 41 pneumonia cases,

mostly in middle-aged men
without underlying conditions in Wuhan.

And they saw some strange stuff.

They saw abnormal CT scans

with what are called
bilateral ground glass opacities.

And these patients received incredibly
sophisticated medical care.

The kitchen sink was thrown at them,

and yet 13 had to go to the ICU
and 6 died.

So this paper was hair raising
and of great interest to me,

both as a person in the financial markets
and as someone very interested in biology.

It’s a dangerous pathogen,
6 of 41 died.

And the big question at the time is,
is there human to human transmission?

And very quickly, we found out
that there is, and indeed,

the novel coronavirus is far more
contagious than influenza

and most other respiratory viruses.

But take a look at this picture below.

That’s not lung tissue.

On the left, normal.
On the right, COVID-19.

This is cardiac tissue.

We now know that COVID
is a multi-system disease,

focusing a great deal on vascular tissue.

By the way, as an aside,
that Chinese data -6 to 41 dying-

that’s not that different from our own.

It looks a lot worse.

But remember, these were
hospitalized patients.

Here’s a little flow chart of outcomes,

typical outcomes
in the spring in the West.

And you can have a look at that
on your own time.

But we must move forward.

So what are the five principles,
and why only five?

Well, five, because I’m doing a TED Talk
and I don’t have a lot of time.

And these are ones that I picked
that are particularly important.

But there are others.

They may seem obvious,

but using them in real life
is not exactly common.

Indeed, our current predicament,
for example,

in the UK and in the US,
and in other places,

stems in part from failing to apply these.

So here’s a preview.

Number one:
Know when you don’t know, be open.

Number two:
Focus on action as information.

Watch what other people do,
rather than listen to what they say.

Number three: Listen to the people
with firsthand experience,

rather than armchair and academic pundits

who have not been
out in the field battling outbreaks.

Number four: Use evidence even if
it doesn’t rise to the standard of proof.

And think about decisions in sequence
as paths, not in isolation.

This last one is the most subtle.

So the first one,
know when you don’t know.

Now, Steven Seagal may not be famous
for work in the philosophy of knowledge

or in risk management,

but this is one important maxim,
a good one to remember.

“Assumptions are the mother of all f-ups.”

That’s from (the movie)
Under Siege 2 - Dark Territory.

And if that’s not good enough for you,

we’ll go to another Stephen,
Stephen Hawking,

saying essentially the same thing.

“The greatest enemy of knowledge
is not ignorance.

It’s the illusion of knowledge.”

So who makes unwarranted assumptions?

Everyone.
You have to actively fight against it.

Ask yourself, “what if?”

The initial idea you have isn’t right.

And here are some questionable assumptions

about SARS-CoV-2
in the US and the UK

circa February 2020.

Many people, including some experts,
treated it as like the flu.

It is nothing like the flu,
the virus is entirely different.

It’s a very different structure.

The disease has
a different pathophysiology

and the outcomes have different
mortality and morbidity rates.

The flu is a meaningless
and misleading comparison.

Another idea was that it can’t be
eradicated or necessarily become endemic.

We’ll have to see on that.

But the Chinese, Australians
and Koreans don’t agree.

Another idea was that travel restrictions
only delay the inevitable.

In fact, only those countries
that have imposed travel restrictions

have successfully managed the outbreak.

We have the “masks don’t work except
for health care workers

where they’re absolutely essential.”

Of course, it’s nonsense
that they don’t work.

They are very important.

And finally, we have the idea
that democratic societies

or countries that aren’t islands
are incapable of responding decisively.

And you have Australia, Korea, China,
all doing a pretty good job.

But you take assumptions like these
and you get the mother of all f-ups.

What’s the correct stance?

We don’t know yet.
Apply precautionary principles.

What are precautionary principles?
Plan for the worst, hope for the best.

There are positive examples.

I’m not going to talk about the negative
examples and take political shots.

Here are positive ones:
Australia, Taiwan, New Zealand, Vietnam.

And also, I can point
to doctors and researchers

who are observant and open-minded.

One comes to mind in particular,

I was reading his posts to social media
back in Europe in the spring.

His name is Dr. Cameron Kyle-Sidell,

and he is an intensive care M.D.
in New York.

And he went public with his concerns
about ventilator use.

He posted, “What I’m seeing is weird”
and he talked about what he was seeing.

“Intensivists out there,
critical care docs out there.

Are you seeing what I’m seeing?
Hit me up. Let’s compare notes”

in so many words.

And he raised important questions

about the best way
to use oxygen and ventilators.

And actually his stance,
that evolved from his openness,

changed the standard of care
in many places.

This is a guy
with the right kind of attitude.

Lesson number two:
Watch actions.

Here’s a quote, great quote,
but he didn’t say it.

Winston Churchill didn’t say it.

“I no longer listen to what people say.
I just watch what they do.”

Here’s another quote which I like,

“Figure out who has the best information,
then watch what they do.”

If somebody said it before me,
they get credit, but I’ve said it.

Anyhow, who knew the most
circa February 2020?

Who should we be watching?
Well, the Chinese.

So what were the Chinese doing
in February 2020?

Strict lockdowns, travel restrictions,
the building out of hospital capacity,

they trialled treatments
with repurposed drugs

and they adopted the goal of zero COVID.

COVID is not something, as we
have learned, that you can live with.

It’s like playing
footsie with a crocodile.

What did Chinese actions tell us
for focusing on what they were doing?

Let’s compare what
they were doing in February

with the sort of messaging
that I heard here.

In February,
the Chinese were locking down

-at first it was 35 million,
then more people-

essentially all of Hubei province
and other parts of the country.

Meanwhile,

our approach was to advise people to
“Please, sneeze into tissues”.

The Chinese actions showed
that they saw the virus as a grave threat.

They had the most information.

That was a message
to the rest of the world.

Watch what they did.

So now we come to lesson number three:
Prioritizing first-hand experience.

So, I am not an expert on virology.

I know a fair bit,

but I don’t compare with the people
who have made a career of virology,

and you may be in a position

where you have to make decisions
or form a view on something,

and you’re not an expert in the field.

Whom should you listen to when different
academic voices are coming at you?

It’s really very simple.

You go with battlefield experience.

you go with people -in this case-
who have been involved in outbreak control

in similar kinds of epidemics in the past.

For example, Mr. Guan Yi -
Dr. Guan Yi in Hong Kong.

This is a guy who was involved in managing
the SARS epidemic in Asia.

He’s been involved in important
outbreaks all over the place.

And his comment in January

-and this was actually before the Lancet
article that I showed you-

his comment was it could be
10 times worse than SARS.

Remember, SARS was an outbreak
of a lethal respiratory coronavirus,

I think in 2003 and 2004.

He also commented that he’s seen it all
and this time he’s petrified.

Then you go to a different part
of the world

with some armchair experts who advise
“This is not something to panic about”.

Actually, “panic” may be the wrong word,

but this is something
to take strong action about.

Listen to people like Guan Yi
who have been in the field.

And this applies whatever the problem,
you’re with battlefield experience.

As I mentioned, the SARS epidemic
provided the experience

that allowed many Asian countries
to do a much better job

than the Western countries
in managing the virus.

Despite the fact that it started there,

and despite that they have
very high population density,

multigenerational living,
a whole range of factors

that should have made it worse.

Taiwan has very close links
to mainland China these days,

and Taiwan has successfully pursued
a zero COVID strategy.

China’s achievements in public health
have been remarkable.

Singapore has done well.

And this is largely because of the lessons
learned in the prior epidemic.

Back to my point on experience.

So why weren’t the experienced
Asian experts heard in January?

That is a big question for me,
is this an example of prejudice?

You know, I leave that question open,

but they’re the people
who had the experience

that would have been most
valuable to our understanding.

So as you know from my background,
I’m a quant.

So where does quantitative modeling
come into all of this?

People like Neil Ferguson.

Αnd my comments are this.

The more novel the situation,
the less useful quant modeling is

because it requires good information
for good output,

but it can provide important qualitative
insights where intuition is poor.

And a good example of this

is when you’re dealing
with exponential processes.

People can’t comprehend
exponential processes.

I’m a mathematician. I can’t.
I’m pretty sure you can’t.

Plus, you’ve heard of the wheat
and chessboard problem.

You’ve got a chessboard
and you have a grain of wheat.

Put one grain on the first square,
double that for the second square,

double that for the third square.

So now you’re up
to like four grains, right?

Keep doubling each time.

And finally,
you’re done with the 64 squares.

How much wheat do you have?

Do you have thousands of grains? No.
Millions? No.

You have 18 quintillion.

It’s beyond trillions, just a vast number.

Exponential processes
get away from you so quickly.

And that’s relevant to this epidemic.

So models can help you recognize
what really matters qualitatively,

even if in the beginning of an epidemic

you may not have enough information
to estimate the details of the model.

Qualitatively, a 50% increase
in transmissibility, like the new variant,

is much worse than
a 50% increase in lethality.

So here’s a good use of quant.

So the reproduction number
of a virus in a population

refers to the number of people

that an infected person
on average will infect.

So R equals 0.9 means
that an infected person

infects 0.9 others on average.

Think of that as 10 infected people
creating 9 more infections.

Now, if you change R by just 0.4

you go from, let’s say, an R of 0.9
to an R of 1.3,

you go from a dwindling outbreak
to explosive growth.

That’s a good use of modeling

because our intuition
doesn’t suggest anything

like the drama
that you see on that graph.

My fourth lesson is you need to understand
that evidence is a continuum.

It’s not yes, no,
but more versus less.

So here is an outpatient
COVID-19 kit from India.

It contains some vitamins,
it contains an oximeter.

It also contains some medications
-well Ok-

that the Indian government deems
effective enough to dispense to people

and safe enough to dispense to people.

So does this kit work?
The proof is not definitive.

But there’s obviously
some positive evidence

associated with the supplements
and medications,

and limited downside.

It’s kind of benefit versus risk,

and the Indian government,
given their circumstances,

has made the decision
in certain states to dispense this.

So what’s the right standard?
How much evidence do you need?

Why don’t you have a kit?

What’s the standard that applies here

and that takes us
into a debate in medicine:

EBM -evidence based medicine-
versus traditionalists.

Actually everybody
is in favor of evidence.

It’s just an evidence based medicine.

A very, very high priority is placed on
what’s called gold standard evidence,

randomized clinical trials.

Traditionalists like those, too,

but they’re willing to consider
other things -

mechanism of action, observational
studies, clinical experience.

From my perspective,
we’re in a risk management issue.

And I’m not outside the mainstream
of medical thinking,

the modern version of the Hippocratic Oath
recognizes this trade off.

You should read the modern version.
It’s very, very beautiful.

You know, make you
want to become a doctor.

Frankly, it’s a very high calling indeed.

But there are two kinds of errors
to balance.

There’s type one
-now we’re in statistics-

errors of omission.

There are type 2 errors of commission:

Errors of omission is
you don’t do something good,

you don’t send out a COVID kit
when you should have.

Errors of commission
is when you do something bad,

you send out a kit that has
bad side effects and injures people.

Commission, omission.

Type 1 and type 2 errors.

So, is evidence based medicine,

which is and which has become, in a way,
the orthodoxy in some Western countries

too much of a good thing
from a risk management standpoint?

I don’t know. I don’t know.

Certainly, it’s helped medicine
a great deal in many contexts.

But pandemics require quick responses

and type 1 errors can be
as bad as type 2 errors,

but they’re less visible.

The thing you didn’t do
but could have helped

is less visible than an active mistake.

Now, a risk management
principle that is very important is

is that uncertainty must be balanced
at an optimal point.

You’re supposed to be
equally uncomfortable.

Did I do too much?
Did I do too little?

If you’re sure you haven’t done too much,
you probably haven’t done enough.

And if you’re sure you haven’t done too
little, you’ve probably done too much.

It’s an idea that I’ve taught traders
who have worked with me

that you’re supposed to be
sort of equally uncomfortable with -

Have I been too aggressive?

Have I been not aggressive enough?

Because when there’s a lot of uncertainty,
you don’t know.

If it’s one sided

it sort of means you’re favoring
one kind of error over another,

and the optimum is unbalanced.

So here’s a risk management perspective
from Robert Rubin,

a very prominent guy in finance,
a very smart guy.

“All decisions are based on imperfect
or incomplete information,

but decisions must be made
on a timely basis.”

The business I was in for 26 years

was all about making decisions
in exactly this way. Indeed.

Finally, my last lesson is to think
about strategy as decision paths,

not as a single decision,

because your choices now will determine
your options and choices later.

Play the tape forward
under different scenarios.

Now here I will make a literary allusion,

one of the great writers, Cormac McCarthy,

and here is a quote
from the El Jefe speech.

It’s a very, very fine
piece of literature.

You should have a look at it.

“Actions create consequences
which produce new worlds.

The world in which you seek to undo
the mistakes that you made,

is different from the world
where the mistakes were made.

And you want to choose,
but there is no choosing there.

There’s only accepting.

The choosing was done a long time ago.”

So he’s referring to the fact

that the choices you make now
will determine the choices you have later,

and this has implications.
Let’s apply it here.

The easy application is to understand

how important it is
to stay ahead of the curve.

It’s not hard to ease up
if things are well controlled.

New Zealand, China and Korea
have lots of options.

If you lose control, things happen fast.
Exponential growth.

Remember the wheat
and chessboard problem?

And you’re on the back foot
and you have few options.

You have a health care system
that will be overrun,

you’re going to have to lock down

and do things
that you don’t want to have to do.

You got to stay ahead of the curve and
keep things under control, tight control,

or you run out -
or you have few options.

So here are my points again:

Know when you don’t know,
which is usually.

Be open, even to things
you don’t want to hear.

Take the emotion out of the picture.

Figure out who has
the best information right now

and watch what they do.

Firsthand experience
usually beats cleverness and math,

although there’s a role for those.

You have to act
without imperfect information,

it’s uncomfortable, but get used to it.

Know about balancing
the two types of errors,

too much versus too little.

Draw out decision trees and choose
those paths that give you options later

and leave room to maneuver
as you learn more.

And as you think about these things,

you can see various policymakers
around the world

applied or did not apply these principles,

and there were major consequences
to the choices.

And then last
and certainly not least,

here are some top sources on the pandemic.

If you really want to know
what’s going on,

these scientists are really excellent
if you want to go in very deep.

You don’t want to miss the upcoming
episode of This Week in Virology.

Their podcasts are always
very informative,

If you want to learn more about the stuff.

And then thank you for your time
and good luck making decisions.

抄写员:Ivy Jin
审稿人:Lucas Kaimaras

嗨,我是
Florin Court Capital 的 Doug Greenig。

我的演讲叫做:

大流行的教训——
你现在需要知道的五件事。

您是否患有 COVID 疲劳症?
我们很多人都是。

当然,也可能是你
感染了新冠病毒,难怪你这么累,

但更有可能是你

每天都被病毒新闻淹没而筋疲力尽。

所以不要害怕,
这个谈话实际上不是关于 COVID 的。

这是关于如何在压力下做出更好的
决定。

现实世界中的决策
是一项棘手的工作。

如果您有足够的信息,几乎每个决策都很容易,

但很多时候,
我们的信息有限,

我们有时间压力,

这使得决策
成为风险管理的一个分支。

我的背景是数学家,

我在伯克利学习了微分拓扑动力学
和混沌理论,并在

那里获得了博士学位。

但我也有
很长的生物学背景。

我做了 30 年的交易员、投资组合经理
和风险经理,

现在我经营一家宏观对冲基金,

我工作的一个关键方面——
也许是最关键的方面——


在很多不确定性的情况下做出相应的决定

, 我们碰巧手头有
一个很好的案例研究。

大约在去年这个时候,我第一次了解到这种病毒

并在一月下旬在《柳叶刀》上看到了一篇论文

标题是:
引起全球健康关注的新型冠状病毒爆发。

那是 1 月 24 日。

这篇论文是
由一些中国医生完成的

,他们谈到了武汉的一
组 41 例肺炎病例,

主要是
没有基础疾病的中年男性。

他们看到了一些奇怪的东西。

他们看到了异常的 CT 扫描

,有所谓的
双侧毛玻璃影。

这些患者接受了极其
复杂的医疗护理。

厨房水槽被扔给他们

,但 13 人不得不去重症监护室
,6 人死亡。

所以这篇论文
引起了我的极大兴趣,

无论是作为金融
市场的人还是对生物学非常感兴趣的人。

这是一种危险的病原体,
41 人中有 6 人死亡。

当时最大的问题是,
是否存在人与人之间的传播?

很快,我们发现

新型冠状病毒确实
比流感

和大多数其他呼吸道病毒更具传染性。

但是看看下面这张照片。

那不是肺组织。

左边,正常。
右侧,COVID-19。

这是心脏组织。

我们现在知道 COVID
是一种多系统疾病,

主要集中在血管组织上。

顺便说一句
,中国的数据 -6 到 41 人死亡 -

这与我们自己的数据并没有什么不同。

看起来差了很多。

但请记住,这些是
住院患者。

这是一个结果的小流程图,

西方春天的典型结果。

您可以
在自己的时间查看。

但我们必须向前迈进。

那么什么是五项原则
,为什么只有五项?

好吧,五个,因为我正在做一个 TED 演讲,
而且我没有很多时间。

这些是我选择
的特别重要的。

但还有其他人。

它们可能看起来很明显,

但在现实生活中使用它们
并不常见。

事实上,我们目前的困境,
例如

在英国和美国
以及其他地方

,部分源于未能应用这些。

所以这里有一个预览。

第一:
在你不知道的时候知道,保持开放。

第二:
关注作为信息的行动。

看别人做什么,
而不是听他们说什么。

第三:倾听那些
有第一手经验的人,

而不是

那些
没有在现场与疫情作斗争的坐在椅子上和学术专家的意见。

第四:使用证据,即使
它没有达到证明的标准。

并将按顺序进行的决策
视为路径,而不是孤立地考虑。

最后一个是最微妙的。

所以第一个,
当你不知道的时候知道。

现在,史蒂文·西格尔 (Steven Seagal) 可能并不以
在知识哲学或风险管理方面的工作而闻名

但这是一个重要的格言,
一个值得记住的好格言。

“假设是所有失败之母。”

那是来自(电影)
围攻下 2 - 黑暗领土。

如果这对你来说还不够好,

我们会去找另一个斯蒂芬,
斯蒂芬霍金,

说基本相同的话。

“知识的最大敌人
不是无知。

这是知识的错觉。”

那么谁会做出无根据的假设呢?

每个人。
你必须积极地与之抗争。

问问自己,“如果?”

你最初的想法是不对的。

以下是

关于 2020 年 2 月左右在美国和英国出现的 SARS-CoV-2 的一些可疑假设

。包括一些专家在内的许多人
将其视为流感。

这与流感
完全不同,病毒完全不同。

这是一个非常不同的结构。

该疾病
具有不同的病理生理学

,其结果具有不同的
死亡率和发病率。

流感是一个毫无意义
和误导性的比较。

另一个想法是它不能被
根除或必然成为地方病。

我们将不得不看到这一点。

但中国人、澳大利亚人
和韩国人不同意。

另一个想法是旅行限制
只会推迟不可避免的事情。

事实上,只有
那些实施旅行限制的国家

才能成功控制疫情。

我们有“口罩不起作用,

除非是绝对必要的医护人员。”

当然,它们不起作用是无稽之谈

它们非常重要。

最后,我们
认为民主社会

或非岛屿国家
无法做出果断反应。

澳大利亚、韩国、中国
都做得很好。

但是你采取这样的假设
,你就会得到所有f-ups的母亲。

正确的姿势是什么?

我们还不知道。
应用预防原则。

什么是预防原则?
做最坏的打算,抱最好的希望。

有积极的例子。

我不打算谈论负面
例子并采取政治措施。

以下是积极的:
澳大利亚、台湾、新西兰、越南。

而且,我可以指出

观察力和思想开放的医生和研究人员。

尤其是我想到了一个,春天

我在欧洲的社交媒体上读了他的帖子

他的名字是 Cameron Kyle-Sidell 博士

,他是纽约的重症监护医学博士

他公开表达了
对呼吸机使用的担忧。

他发帖称,“我所看到的很奇怪”
,并谈到了他所看到的。

“那里有
重症监护医生,那里有重症监护医生。

你看到我看到的了吗?
打我。 让我们来比较一下”

用这么多的话来说。

他还提出了

有关
使用氧气和呼吸机的最佳方式的重要问题。

事实上,他的立场,
从他的开放性演变而来,

改变了许多地方的护理标准

这是
一个态度正确的人。

第二课:
观察动作。

这是一个引述,很棒的引述,
但他没有说出来。

温斯顿丘吉尔没有说。

“我不再听人们说什么。
我只是看他们做什么。”

这是我喜欢的另一句话,

“找出谁拥有最好的信息,
然后观察他们的所作所为。”

如果有人在我之前说过,
他们会得到荣誉,但我已经说过了。

无论如何,谁最了解
大约在 2020 年 2 月?

我们应该关注谁?
嗯,中国人。

那么中国人
在 2020 年 2 月做了什么?

严格的封锁、旅行限制
、扩大医院容量,他们尝试

使用重新调整用途的药物进行治疗,

并采用了零 COVID 的目标。

正如我们所知,
COVID 不是您可以忍受的东西。

这就像
和鳄鱼玩footsie。

中国的行动告诉我们什么让我们
专注于他们正在做的事情?

让我们将
他们在二月份

所做的事情与
我在这里听到的信息进行比较。

2 月
,中国人开始

封锁——起初是 3500 万,
然后是更多人——

基本上是整个湖北省
和全国其他地区。

同时,

我们的方法是建议人们
“请用纸巾打喷嚏”。

中国的行动表明
,他们将病毒视为严重威胁。

他们拥有最多的信息。

这是
给世界其他地方的信息。

看看他们做了什么。

所以现在我们来到第三课:
优先考虑第一手经验。

所以,我不是病毒学专家。

我知道一些,

但我无法与
从事病毒学事业的人相比

,你可能处于

必须做出决定
或对某事形成看法的位置,

而你不是专家 在该领域。

当不同的
学术声音向你袭来时,你应该听谁的?

这真的很简单。

你带着战场经验去。

在这种情况下,您与
过去曾参与

过类似流行病的爆发控制的人一起去。

比如关一先生——
香港的关一博士。

这是一个参与管理
亚洲非典疫情的人。

他参与
了各地的重大疫情。

他在一月份发表的评论

——这实际上是在我向你展示的《柳叶刀》文章之前——

他的评论是它可能
比 SARS 严重 10 倍。

请记住,SARS
是一种致命的呼吸道冠状病毒的爆发,

我认为是在 2003 年和 2004 年。

他还评论说他已经看到了这一切
,这一次他被吓呆了。

然后你

和一些扶手椅专家一起去世界的另一个地方,他们建议
“这不是什么可怕的事情”。

实际上,“恐慌”可能是错误的词,

但这是
需要采取强有力的行动的事情。

听听像管毅这样的
人,一直在这个领域。

这适用于任何问题,
你有战场经验。

正如我所提到的,非典疫情
提供的经验

使许多亚洲

国家
在控制病毒方面比西方国家做得更好。

尽管它从那里开始

,尽管他们有
非常高的人口密度,

多代人的生活,
但一系列因素

本应使情况变得更糟。 如今,台湾

与中国大陆的联系非常密切

,台湾已成功
推行零新冠病毒战略。

中国在公共卫生领域取得的成就
令人瞩目。

新加坡做得很好。

而这很大程度上是因为
在之前的流行病中吸取了教训。

回到我的经验。

那么为什么一月份没有听到经验丰富的
亚洲专家的意见呢?

这对我来说是个大问题,
这是偏见的例子吗?

你知道,我没有回答这个问题,

但他们是
那些拥有

对我们理解最有价值的经验的人。

正如你从我的背景中知道的那样,
我是一名量化分析师。

那么,量化
建模在这一切中的作用是什么?

像尼尔弗格森这样的人。

我的评论是这样的。

情况越新颖
,量化建模就越没用,

因为它需要良好的信息
才能获得良好的输出,

但它可以
在直觉较差的情况下提供重要的定性见解。

处理指数过程时就是一个很好的例子

人们无法理解
指数过程。

我是一名数学家。 我不能。
我很确定你不能。

另外,你听说过小麦
和棋盘问题。

你有一个棋盘
,你有一粒小麦。

在第一个格子上放一个谷物,
第二个格子

加倍,第三个格子加倍。

所以现在你
最多喜欢四粒谷物,对吧?

每次保持翻倍。

最后,
你完成了 64 个方格。

你有多少小麦?

你有成千上万的谷物吗? 不,
数百万? 不,

你有 18 个 quintillion。

它超过了数万亿,只是一个庞大的数字。

指数过程
如此迅速地远离你。

这与这次流行病有关。

因此,模型可以帮助您从质量上
识别真正重要的东西,

即使在流行病开始时

您可能没有足够的信息
来估计模型的细节。

定性地说,传播率增加 50%
,就像新变种一样,


杀伤力增加 50% 要差得多。

所以这里很好地使用了 quant。

所以
病毒在人群中的繁殖

数是

指一个感染
者平均会感染的人数。

所以 R 等于 0.9
意味着一个感染

者平均会感染 0.9 个其他人。

可以将其想象为 10 名感染者再
造成 9 次感染。

现在,如果您将 R 仅更改 0.4

,那么您将从
0.9 的 R 变为 1.3 的 R,

您将从逐渐减少的爆发
变为爆炸性增长。

这是对建模的一个很好的使用,

因为我们的直觉
并没有暗示任何


你在该图表上看到的戏剧那样的东西。

我的第四课是你需要
了解证据是一个连续统一体。

不是是,不是,
而是多与少。

这是
来自印度的门诊 COVID-19 试剂盒。

它含有一些维生素,
它包含一个血氧计。

它还包含一些药物
——好吧——

印度政府认为这些药物
足够有效,可以分发给人们

,也足够安全,可以分发给人们。

那么这个套件有用吗?
证据不是确定的。

但显然
有一些

与补充剂
和药物相关的积极证据,

以及有限的不利因素。

这是一种利益与风险

,印度政府,
考虑到他们的情况,

已经
在某些州做出了放弃这种做法的决定。

那么正确的标准是什么?
你需要多少证据?

为什么你没有套件?

这里适用的标准是什么

,让我们
进入医学辩论:

EBM - 循证医学 -
与传统主义者。

事实上,每个人
都赞成证据。

这只是一种循证医学。

一个非常非常高的优先级放在
所谓的黄金标准证据,

随机临床试验。

传统主义者也喜欢这些,

但他们愿意考虑
其他事情——

作用机制、观察性
研究、临床经验。

从我的角度来看,
我们处于风险管理问题中。

而且我不在医学思想的主流之外

,现代版的希波克拉底誓言
承认这种权衡。

您应该阅读现代版本。
它非常非常漂亮。

你知道,让你
想成为一名医生。

坦率地说,这确实是一个很高的要求。

但是有两种错误
需要平衡。

有一种类型
——现在我们在统计

中——遗漏错误。

有 2 类佣金

错误:遗漏错误是
你没有做好事,

你没有
在应该有的时候发送 COVID 工具包。

委托错误
是当您做坏事时,

您发出的工具包具有
不良的副作用并伤害了人们。

佣金,遗漏。

类型 1 和类型 2 错误。

那么,从风险管理的角度

来看,在某些西方国家已经成为并且已经成为
正统观念

的循证医学是不是太好
了?

我不知道。 我不知道。

当然,它
在许多情况下对医学有很大帮助。

但流行病需要快速反应

,1 型错误可能
与 2 型错误一样严重,

但它们不太明显。

你没有做
但本可以帮助

的事情不如主动错误那么明显。

现在,一个非常重要的风险管理
原则

是,必须
在最佳点平衡不确定性。

你应该
同样不舒服。

我做的太多了吗?
我做的太少了吗?

如果你确定你没有做太多,
那么你可能做得还不够。

如果你确定你没有做得
太少,那么你可能做得太多了。

这是我教给与我合作过的交易员的一个想法

,你应该
同样感到不舒服——

我是否过于激进?

是我不够激进吗?

因为当有很多不确定性时,
你不知道。

如果它是一面倒的,

那就意味着你偏爱
一种错误而不是另一种错误,

而最佳值是不平衡的。

所以这里有罗伯特鲁宾的风险管理
观点,

他是金融界非常杰出的人
,非常聪明的人。

“所有决策都基于不完整
或不完整的信息,

但必须及时做出决策
。”

我从事的 26 年业务就是以

这种方式做出决策。 的确。

最后,我的最后一课是
将战略视为决策路径,

而不是单个决策,

因为您现在的选择将决定
您的选择和以后的选择。

在不同的场景下播放磁带。

现在在这里我将做一个文学典故,

一位伟大的作家,科马克麦卡锡

,这里
引用埃尔杰夫演讲的一段话。

这是一部非常非常优秀
的文学作品。

你应该看看它。

“行动会产生后果
,从而产生新的世界。

您寻求消除
所犯错误

的世界与犯错误的世界不同

你想选择,
但那里没有选择。

只有接受。

选择是很久以前的事了。”

所以他指的是

你现在做出
的选择将决定你以后的选择

,这是有影响的。
让我们在这里应用它。

简单的应用是

了解保持领先地位的重要性。

如果事情控制得好,放松并不难

新西兰、中国和韩国
有很多选择。

如果你失去控制,事情就会发生得很快。
指数增长。

还记得小麦
和棋盘问题吗?

而且您处于不利地位
,几乎没有选择。

您的医疗保健
系统将超支,

您将不得不锁定

并做
您不想做的事情。

你必须保持领先并
保持控制,严格控制,

否则你会用尽 -
或者你几乎没有选择。

所以我的观点是:

当你不知道的时候知道,
这通常是。

保持开放,即使是
你不想听到的事情。

把情绪从照片中拿出来。

找出谁
现在拥有最好的信息

并观察他们的所作所为。

第一手经验
通常胜过聪明才智和数学,

尽管这些都有作用。

你必须在
没有不完整信息的情况下采取行动,

这很不舒服,但要习惯它。

了解
平衡两种类型的错误,

太多与太少。

画出决策树并选择
那些可以稍后为您提供选择的路径,


在您了解更多信息时留出回旋余地。

当你思考这些事情时,

你可以看到世界各地的各种政策制定者

应用或不应用这些原则,

并且对这些选择产生了重大影响

最后
,当然同样重要的是,

这里有一些关于大流行的主要消息来源。

如果你真的想知道
发生了什么,如果你想深入了解,

这些科学家真的
很棒。

你不想错过
本周病毒学即将播出的一集。

如果您想了解有关这些内容的更多信息,他们的播客总是非常有用。

然后感谢您抽出时间并祝您
好运做出决定。