How people rationalize fraud Kelly Richmond Pope

If you ask people whether
they think stealing is wrong,

most of them would answer, “Yes.”

And yet, in 2013, organizations
all over the world

lost an estimated total
of 3.7 trillion dollars to fraud,

which includes crimes like embezzlement,

pyramid schemes,

and false insurance claims.

This wasn’t just the work
of a few bad apples.

The truth is that many people
are susceptible

not only to the temptation
to commit fraud

but to convincing themselves
that they’ve done nothing wrong.

So why does fraud happen?

While individual motivations
may differ from case to case,

the fraud triangle,

a model developed
by criminologist Donald Cressey,

shows three conditions
that make fraud likely:

pressure, opportunity,
and rationalization.

Pressure is often what motivates someone
to engage in fraud to begin with.

It could be a personal debt,

an addiction,

an earnings quota,

a sudden job loss,

or an illness in the family.

As for opportunity, many people
in both public and private sectors

have access to tools that enable them
to commit and conceal fraud:

corporate credit cards,

internal company data,

or control over the budget.

The combination of pressure

and being exposed to such opportunities
on a daily basis

can create a strong temptation.

But even with these two elements,

most fraud still requires rationalization.

Many fraudsters are first time offenders,

so in order to commit an act
most would regard as wrong,

they need to justify it to themselves.

Some feel entitled to the money
because they are underpaid and overworked

and others believe
their fraud is victimless,

perhaps even planning to return
the money once their crisis is resolved.

Some of the most common types of fraud

don’t even register as such
to the perpetrator.

Examples include employees
fudging time sheets or expense reports,

taxpayers failing to report cash earnings,

or service providers overbilling
insurance companies.

Though these may seem small,

and can sometimes
only involve hundreds of dollars,

they all contribute to the big picture.

And then there’s fraud on a massive scale.

In 2003, Italian dairy food giant
Parmalat went bankrupt

after it was found to have fabricated
a 4 billion dollar bank account

and falsified financial statements

to hide the fact that its subsidiaries
had been losing money.

Because it was family controlled,

corporate governance
and regulator supervision were difficult,

and the company likely hoped
that the losses could be recouped

before anyone found out.

And it’s not just corporate greed.

Governments and non-profits
are also susceptible to fraud.

During her time as City Comptroller
for Dixon, Illinois,

Rita Crundwell embezzled
over 53 million dollars.

Rita was one of the country’s leading
quarter horse breeders

and winner of 52 world championships.

But the cost of maintaining the herd
ran to 200,000 dollars per month.

Because her position gave her complete
control over city finances,

she was easily able to divert money

to an account she used
for private expenses,

and the scheme went
unnoticed for 20 years.

It is believed that Crundwell
felt entitled to a lavish lifestyle

based on her position,

and the notoriety
her winnings brought to the city.

It’s tempting to think of fraud
as a victimless crime

because corporations
and civic institutions aren’t people.

But fraud harms real people
in virtually every case:

the employees of Parmalat
who lost their jobs,

the citizens of Dixon whose taxes
subsidized horse breeding,

the customers of companies
which raise their prices to offset losses.

Sometimes the effects are obvious
and devestating,

like when Bernie Madoff caused thousands
of people to lose their life savings.

But often they’re subtle
and not easy to untangle.

Yet someone,
somewhere is left holding the bill.

如果你问人们
是否认为偷窃是错误的,

他们中的大多数会回答“是的”。

然而,在 2013 年,
世界各地的组织

因欺诈损失了约 3.7 万亿美元,

其中包括贪污、

传销

和虚假保险索赔等犯罪。

这不仅仅是
几个坏苹果的工作。

事实是,许多人

不仅容易
受到欺诈的诱惑,

而且容易说服
自己他们没有做错任何事。

那么为什么会发生欺诈呢?

虽然个人动机
可能因案例而异,

犯罪学家唐纳德·克雷西(Donald Cressey)开发的欺诈三角模型

显示
了使欺诈成为可能的三个条件:

压力、机会
和合理化。

压力往往是促使
某人开始进行欺诈的原因。

这可能是个人债务

、上瘾

、收入配额

、突然失业

或家庭疾病。

至于机会,
公共和私营部门的许多人

都可以使用使他们
能够实施和隐藏欺诈的工具:

公司信用卡、

公司内部数据

或对预算的控制。

压力

和每天接触这些
机会的结合

会产生强烈的诱惑。

但即使有这两个要素,

大多数欺诈行为仍然需要合理化。

许多欺诈者都是初犯,

所以为了做出
大多数人认为是错误的行为,

他们需要为自己辩解。

有些人
因为工资过低和劳累过度

而觉得有权获得这笔钱,而另一些人则认为
他们的欺诈行为是无害的,

甚至可能计划
在危机解决后退还这笔钱。

一些最常见的欺诈类型

甚至没有
向肇事者登记。

示例包括员工
伪造时间表或费用报告,

纳税人未能报告现金收入,

或服务提供商向
保险公司多收费用。

虽然这些看起来很小

,有时可能
只涉及数百美元,

但它们都有助于全局。

然后是大规模的欺诈行为。

2003 年,意大利乳制品巨头 Parmalat

因被发现
伪造 40 亿美元的银行账户

并伪造财务报表

以掩盖其子公司
一直在亏损的事实而破产。

因为是家族控制,

公司治理
和监管难度较大

,公司很可能希望
在被

人发现之前弥补损失。

这不仅仅是企业的贪婪。

政府和非营利组织
也容易受到欺诈。

在担任
伊利诺伊州迪克森市的市审计长期间,

丽塔·克鲁德威尔挪用
了超过 5300 万美元。

丽塔是该国领先的
四分之一马饲养员之一,

并获得了 52 次世界锦标赛冠军。

但维持牛群的成本
每月高达 200,000 美元。

因为她的职位让她完全
控制了城市的财政,

她很容易将钱转移

到她用于私人开支的账户中

并且这个计划
被忽视了 20 年。

据信,

基于她的地位,

以及
她的奖金给这座城市带来的恶名,Crundwell 觉得自己有权享受奢华的生活方式。

人们很容易将欺诈
视为一种没有受害者的犯罪,

因为公司
和民间机构不是人。

但欺诈
几乎在每一种情况下都会伤害到真实的人:失去工作

的帕玛拉特员工

,税收补贴养马的迪克森市民

,提高价格以抵消损失的公司的客户。

有时影响是显而易见的
和毁灭性的,

比如伯尼麦道夫导致成千上万
的人失去了毕生积蓄。

但它们通常很微妙
,不容易解开。

然而,有人在
某个地方拿着账单。