Why do competitors open their stores next to one another Jac de Haan

Translator: tom carter
Reviewer: Bedirhan Cinar

Why are gas stations always built
right next to other gas stations?

Why can I drive for a mile
without finding a coffee shop

and then stumble
across three on the same corner?

Why do grocery stores,
auto repair shops and restaurants

always seem to exist in groups

instead of being spread evenly
throughout a community?

While there are several factors

that might go into deciding
where to place your business,

clusters of similar companies can
be explained by a very simple story

called Hotelling’s Model
of Spatial Competition.

Imagine that you sell
ice cream at the beach.

Your beach is one mile long
and you have no competition.

Where would you place your cart
in order to sell the most product?

In the middle.

The one-half-mile walk may
be too far for some people

at each end of the beach,

but your cart serves
as many people as possible.

One day you show up at work

just as your cousin Teddy
is arriving at the beach

with his own ice cream cart.

In fact, he’s selling

exactly the same type
of ice cream as you are.

You agree that you will split
the beach in half.

In order to ensure that customers
don’t have to walk too far

you set up your cart a quarter mile
south of the beach center,

right in the middle of your territory.

Teddy sets up a quarter mile
north of the center,

in the middle of Teddy territory.

With this agreement, everyone south
of you buys ice cream from you.

Everyone north of Teddy buys from him,
and the 50% of beachgoers in between

walk to the closest cart.

No one walks
more than a quarter of a mile,

and both vendors sell
to half of the beachgoers.

Game theorists consider
this a socially optimal solution.

It minimizes the maximum number
of steps any visitor must take

in order to reach an ice cream cart.

The next day, when you arrive at work,

Teddy has set up his cart
in the middle of the beach.

You return to your location
a quarter mile south of center

and get the 25% of customers
to the south of you.

Teddy still gets all of the customers
north in Teddy territory,

but now you split the 25% of people
in between the two carts.

Day three of the ice cream wars,
you get to the beach early,

and set up right in the center
of Teddy territory,

assuming you’ll serve
the 75% of beachgoers to your south,

leaving your cousin to sell
to the 25% of customers to the north.

When Teddy arrives,
he sets up just south of you

stealing all of the southerly customers,

and leaving you with a small group
of people to the north.

Not to be outdone, you move 10 paces
south of Teddy to regain your customers.

When you take a mid-day break,
Teddy shuffles 10 paces south of you,

and again, steals back all the customers
to the far end of the beach.

Throughout the course of the day,

both of you continue
to periodically move south

towards the bulk of the ice cream buyers,

until both of you eventually end up
at the center of the beach,

back to back, each serving 50%
of the ice-cream-hungry beachgoers.

At this point, you
and your competitive cousin

have reached what game theorists
call a Nash Equilibrium -

the point where neither of you
can improve your position

by deviating from your current strategy.

Your original strategy,

where you were each a quarter mile
from the middle of the beach,

didn’t last, because it wasn’t
a Nash Equilibrium.

Either of you could move your cart
towards the other to sell more ice cream.

With both of you now
in the center of the beach,

you can’t reposition your cart
closer to your furthest customers

without making your current
customers worse off.

However, you no longer have
a socially optimal solution,

since customers at either end of the beach

have to walk further than necessary
to get a sweet treat.

Think about all the fast food chains,

clothing boutiques,
or mobile phone kiosks at the mall.

Customers may be better served

by distributing services
throughout a community,

but this leaves businesses vulnerable
to aggressive competition.

In the real world, customers come
from more than one direction,

and businesses are free to compete
with marketing strategies,

by differentiating their product line,
and with price cuts,

but at the heart of their strategy,

companies like to keep their competition
as close as possible.

译者:tom carter
审稿人:Bedirhan Cinar

为什么加油站总是建
在其他加油站旁边?

为什么我可以开一英里
而没有找到一家咖啡店

,然后
在同一个拐角处偶然发现三个?

为什么杂货店、
汽车修理店和餐馆

似乎总是成群结队地存在,

而不是均匀分布
在整个社区?

虽然有几个

因素可能会影响
您的业务在哪里

,但类似公司的集群可以
用一个非常简单的故事来解释,这个故事

叫做霍特林
的空间竞争模型。

想象一下,你
在海滩上卖冰淇淋。

你的海滩有一英里长
,你没有竞争对手。

为了销售最多的产品,您会将购物车放在哪里?

在中间。

对于海滩两端的某些人来说,半英里的步行路程
可能太远了

但您的购物车可以
为尽可能多的人服务。

有一天,

当你的表弟泰迪

带着他自己的冰淇淋车到达海滩时,你出现在工作中。

事实上,他卖

的冰淇淋类型和你一模一样。

您同意
将海滩分成两半。

为了确保客户
不必走太远,

您将购物车设置
在海滩中心以南四分之一英里处,

就在您的领土中间。

泰迪
在中心以北四分之一英里处,

在泰迪领地的中间。

有了这个协议,你们南方的每个人都会
向你们购买冰淇淋。

泰迪以北的每个人都从他那里购买
,50% 的海滩游客

步行到最近的购物车。

没有人步行
超过四分之一英里

,两家供应商都
向一半的海滩游客出售。

博弈论者认为
这是社会最优解。

它最大限度地减少了
任何访客

为了到达冰淇淋车而必须采取的最大步骤数。

第二天,当你上班时,

泰迪已经把他的手推车
放在了海滩中央。

您返回
中心以南四分之一英里的位置

,并将 25% 的客户吸引
到您以南。

Teddy 仍然
在 Teddy 领地北部吸引所有顾客,

但现在您将 25% 的
人分成两辆推车之间。

冰淇淋大战的第三天,
你早早到达海滩,

并在
泰迪领地的中心设置,

假设
你将为南部 75% 的海滩游客提供服务,

让你的表弟
卖给 25% 的 北方的顾客。

当泰迪到达时,
他在你的南边设置了

所有的南方顾客,

并把你和一小
群人留在了北方。

不甘示弱,您
向泰迪以南移动 10 步以重新获得您的客户。

当你在中午休息时,
泰迪在你以南 10 步的地方移动,

然后又把所有的顾客都偷
回了海滩的尽头。

在一天的整个过程中

,你们俩都
继续周期性地向南

移动到大部分冰淇淋购买者,

直到你们俩最终背靠背地
到达海滩的中心

,每个人都提供 50%
的冰- 渴望奶油的海滩游客。

在这一点上,你
和你的竞争表亲

已经达到了博弈论者所
说的纳什均衡——

在这一点上,你们
都无法通过偏离当前策略来提高自己的地位

你最初的策略,

即你们每个人都
离海滩中央四分之一英里,

并没有持续下去,因为它
不是纳什均衡。

你们中的任何一个都可以将您的购物车
移向另一个以出售更多的冰淇淋。

由于你们俩现在都
在海滩的中心,

您无法将您的购物车重新定位
到离您最远的客户更近的位置,

而不会让您当前的
客户变得更糟。

然而,你不再有
一个社会最优的解决方案,

因为海滩两端的顾客

必须走得比必要的更远
才能得到甜点。

想想商场里所有的快餐连锁店、

服装精品店
或手机亭。 通过在整个社区中分发

服务可能会更好地为客户

服务

但这会使企业容易
受到激烈竞争的影响。

在现实世界中,客户
来自多个方向

,企业可以自由地
与营销策略

、产品线差异化
和降价竞争,

但作为战略的核心,

企业希望与竞争对手保持密切的
竞争关系 尽可能。