Can you solve the pirate riddle Alex Gendler

It’s a good day to be a pirate.

Amaro and his four mateys,

Bart,

Charlotte,

Daniel,

and Eliza

have struck gold:

a chest with 100 coins.

But now, they must divvy up the booty
according to the pirate code.

As captain, Amaro gets to propose
how to distribute the coins.

Then, each pirate,
including Amaro himself,

gets to vote either yarr or nay.

If the vote passes, or if there’s a tie,
the coins are divided according to plan.

But if the majority votes nay,

Amaro must walk the plank

and Bart becomes captain.

Then, Bart gets to propose
a new distribution

and all remaining pirates vote again.

If his plan is rejected,
he walks the plank, too,

and Charlotte takes his place.

This process repeats,

with the captain’s hat moving to Daniel
and then Eliza

until either a proposal is accepted
or there’s only one pirate left.

Naturally, each pirate wants to stay alive
while getting as much gold as possible.

But being pirates,
none of them trust each other,

so they can’t collaborate in advance.

And being blood-thirsty pirates,

if anyone thinks they’ll end up
with the same amount of gold either way,

they’ll vote to make the captain
walk the plank just for fun.

Finally, each pirate is excellent
at logical deduction

and knows that the others are, too.

What distribution should Amaro
propose to make sure he lives?

Pause here if you want to figure
it out for yourself!

Answer in: 3

Answer in: 2

Answer in: 1

If we follow our intuition,

it seems like Amaro should try to bribe
the other pirates with most of the gold

to increase the chances of his plan
being accepted.

But it turns out he can do
much better than that. Why?

Like we said, the pirates all know
each other to be top-notch logicians.

So when each votes, they won’t just
be thinking about the current proposal,

but about all possible outcomes
down the line.

And because the rank order is known
in advance,

each can accurately predict how the others
would vote in any situation

and adjust their own votes accordingly.

Because Eliza’s last, she has the most
outcomes to consider,

so let’s start by following
her thought process.

She’d reason this out by working
backwards from the last possible scenario

with only her and Daniel remaining.

Daniel would obviously propose
to keep all the gold

and Eliza’s one vote would not be
enough to override him,

so Eliza wants to avoid this situation
at all costs.

Now we move to the previous decision point

with three pirates left
and Charlotte making the proposal.

Everyone knows that if she’s outvoted,
the decision moves to Daniel,

who will then get all the gold
while Eliza gets nothing.

So to secure Eliza’s vote,

Charlotte only needs to offer her
slightly more than nothing, one coin.

Since this ensures her support,

Charlotte doesn’t need to offer Daniel
anything at all.

What if there are four pirates?

As captain, Bart would still only need
one other vote for his plan to pass.

He knows that Daniel wouldn’t want
the decision to pass to Charlotte,

so he would offer Daniel one coin
for his support

with nothing for Charlotte or Eliza.

Now we’re back at the initial vote
with all five pirates standing.

Having considered all the other scenarios,

Amaro knows that if he goes overboard,

the decision comes down to Bart,

which would be bad news
for Charlotte and Eliza.

So he offers them one coin each,
keeping 98 for himself.

Bart and Daniel vote nay,

but Charlotte and Eliza
grudgingly vote yarr

knowing that the alternative
would be worse for them.

The pirate game involves some interesting
concepts from game theory.

One is the concept of common knowledge

where each person is aware of what
the others know

and uses this to predict their reasoning.

And the final distribution is an example
of a Nash equilibrium

where each player knows every other
players' strategy

and chooses theirs accordingly.

Even though it may lead to a worse
outcome for everyone

than cooperating would,

no individual player can benefit
by changing their strategy.

So it looks like Amaro gets to keep
most of the gold,

and the other pirates might need
to find better ways

to use those impressive logic skills,

like revising this absurd pirate code.

成为海盗的好日子。

Amaro 和他的四个伙伴 Bart、

Charlotte、

Daniel

和 Eliza

找到了金子:

一个装有 100 个硬币的箱子。

但是现在,他们必须
按照盗版密码来瓜分战利品。

作为船长,阿马罗开始提议
如何分配硬币。

然后,每个海盗,
包括阿马罗本人,

都可以投反对票或反对票。

如果投票通过,或者如果出现平局
,则按计划分配硬币。

但如果多数人投反对票,

阿马罗必须走板凳

,巴特成为队长。

然后,巴特开始提议
一个新的分配

,所有剩余的海盗再次投票。

如果他的计划被拒绝,
他也会走木板

,夏洛特取代他的位置。

这个过程重复

,船长的帽子移到丹尼尔
,然后是伊丽莎,

直到接受提议
或只剩下一个海盗。

自然,每个海盗都希望
在获得尽可能多的金币的同时还活着。

但是作为海盗,
他们之间没有一个是相互信任的,

所以他们不能提前合作。

作为嗜血的海盗,

如果有人认为他们最终会
得到相同数量的黄金,

他们会投票让船长
走木板只是为了好玩。

最后,每个海盗都
擅长逻辑推理,

并且知道其他海盗也是如此。

Amaro 应该提出什么样的分配
来确保他活着?

如果您想自己弄清楚,请在此处暂停

答案:3

答案:2

答案:1

如果我们遵循直觉,

似乎阿马罗应该尝试
用大部分黄金贿赂其他海盗,

以增加他的计划
被接受的机会。

但事实证明,他可以做得
比这更好。 为什么?

就像我们说的,海盗们都知道
对方是一流的逻辑学家。

因此,当每个人投票时,他们不仅
会考虑当前的提案,还会

考虑所有可能的
结果。

而且由于事先知道排名顺序
,因此

每个人都可以准确地预测其他人
在任何情况下会如何投票,

并相应地调整自己的投票。

因为 Eliza 是最后一个,她
要考虑的结果最多,

所以让我们从
她的思考过程开始。

她会
从最后一个可能的情况开始倒推

,只剩下她和丹尼尔。

丹尼尔显然会
提议保留所有的黄金,

而伊丽莎的一票
不足以推翻他,

所以伊丽莎想不惜一切代价避免这种情况

现在我们转到前一个决策点

,剩下三个海盗
,夏洛特提出建议。

每个人都知道,如果她被否决
,决定权将转移给丹尼尔,

他将获得所有金牌,
而伊丽莎则一无所获。

因此,为了确保伊丽莎的选票,

夏洛特只需要给她
一个硬币,比什么都多一点。

由于这确保了她的支持,

夏洛特根本不需要向丹尼尔提供
任何东西。

如果有四个海盗呢?

作为队长,巴特仍然只需要再
投一票就可以通过他的计划。

他知道丹尼尔不想
把决定权交给夏洛特,

所以他会给丹尼尔一枚硬币
作为他的支持

,而夏洛特或伊丽莎则一无所有。

现在我们回到最初的投票
,所有五名海盗都站着。

在考虑了所有其他情况后,

阿马罗知道如果他太过分了

,决定权归于巴特,

这对夏洛特和伊丽莎来说是个坏消息

所以他给他们每人一枚硬币,
自己留着98。

巴特和丹尼尔投反对票,

但夏洛特和伊丽莎不
情愿地投了 yarr 的票

,因为他们知道替代方案
对他们来说会更糟。

海盗游戏涉及
博弈论中一些有趣的概念。

一个是常识的概念

,每个人都
知道其他人知道什么,

并以此来预测他们的推理。

最终分布是
纳什均衡的一个例子,

其中每个玩家都知道其他
玩家的策略

并相应地选择他们的策略。

尽管这可能会给
每个人带来

比合作更糟糕的结果,但

没有一个玩家可以
通过改变他们的策略而受益。

所以看起来 Amaro 可以保留
大部分金币,

而其他海盗可能
需要找到更好的方法

来使用这些令人印象深刻的逻辑技能,

比如修改这个荒谬的海盗代码。