Which voting system is the best Alex Gendler

Imagine we want to build a new space port

at one of four recently settled
Martian bases,

and are holding a vote
to determine its location.

Of the hundred colonists on Mars,
42 live on West Base, 26 on North Base,

15 on South Base, and 17 on East Base.

For our purposes, let’s assume
that everyone prefers the space port

to be as close to their base as possible,
and will vote accordingly.

What is the fairest way
to conduct that vote?

The most straightforward solution
would be to just let each individual

cast a single ballot, and choose
the location with the most votes.

This is known as plurality voting,
or “first past the post.”

In this case, West Base wins easily,

since it has more residents
than any other.

And yet, most colonists would consider
this the worst result,

given how far it is from everyone else.

So is plurality vote
really the fairest method?

What if we tried a system
like instant runoff voting,

which accounts for the full range
of people’s preferences

rather than just their top choices?

Here’s how it would work.

First, voters rank
each of the options from 1 to 4,

and we compare their top picks.

South receives the fewest votes
for first place, so it’s eliminated.

Its 15 votes get allocated
to those voters’ second choice—

East Base— giving it a total of 32.

We then compare top preferences
and cut the last place option again.

This time North Base is eliminated.

Its residents’ second choice
would’ve been South Base,

but since that’s already gone,
the votes go to their third choice.

That gives East 58 votes over West’s 42,
making it the winner.

But this doesn’t seem fair either.

Not only did East start out
in second-to-last place,

but a majority ranked it among
their two least preferred options.

Instead of using rankings, we could try
voting in multiple rounds,

with the top two winners
proceeding to a separate runoff.

Normally, this would mean West and North
winning the first round,

and North winning the second.

But the residents of East Base realize

that while they don’t have
the votes to win,

they can still skew the results
in their favor.

In the first round, they vote
for South Base instead of their own,

successfully keeping North
from advancing.

Thanks to this “tactical voting”
by East Base residents,

South wins the second round easily,
despite being the least populated.

Can a system be called fair and good
if it incentivizes lying

about your preferences?

Maybe what we need to do
is let voters express a preference

in every possible head-to-head matchup.

This is known as the Condorcet method.

Consider one matchup:
West versus North.

All 100 colonists vote on their preference
between the two.

So that’s West’s 42 versus
the 58 from North, South, and East,

who would all prefer North.

Now do the same
for the other five matchups.

The victor will be whichever base
wins the most times.

Here, North wins three
and South wins two.

These are indeed the two
most central locations,

and North has the advantage of not being
anyone’s least preferred choice.

So does that make the Condorcet method
an ideal voting system in general?

Not necessarily.

Consider an election
with three candidates.

If voters prefer A over B, and B over C,
but prefer C over A,

this method fails to select a winner.

Over the decades, researchers
and statisticians have come up with

dozens of intricate ways
of conducting and counting votes,

and some have even been
put into practice.

But whichever one you choose,

it’s possible to imagine it delivering
an unfair result.

It turns out that our intuitive concept
of fairness

actually contains a number of assumptions
that may contradict each other.

It doesn’t seem fair for some voters
to have more influence than others.

But nor does it seem fair to simply
ignore minority preferences,

or encourage people to game the system.

In fact, mathematical proofs
have shown that for any election

with more than two options,

it’s impossible to design a voting system
that doesn’t violate

at least some theoretically
desirable criteria.

So while we often think of democracy
as a simple matter of counting votes,

it’s also worth considering who benefits
from the different ways of counting them.

想象一下,我们想

在四个最近定居的
火星基地之一建造一个新的太空港,

并正在举行投票
以确定其位置。

在火星上的一百名殖民者中,有
42 人住在西基地,26 人住在北基地,

15 人住在南基地,17 人住在东基地。

出于我们的目的,让我们
假设每个人都

希望太空港尽可能靠近他们的基地,
并会相应地投票。 进行该投票

的最公平方式是什么

最直接的解决
方案是让每个人

投一张选票,然后选择
得票最多的位置。

这被称为复数投票,
或“第一个通过职位”。

在这种情况下,西基地很容易获胜,

因为它的居民
比其他任何地方都多。

然而,大多数殖民者会认为
这是最糟糕的结果,

因为它离其他人有多远。

那么,多数投票
真的是最公平的方法吗?

如果我们尝试
像即时决选投票这样的系统,

它会考虑
到人们的全部偏好,

而不仅仅是他们的首选?

这是它的工作原理。

首先,选民
从 1 到 4 对每个选项进行排名

,我们比较他们的首选。

南获得第一名的选票最少
,因此被淘汰。

它的 15 票被分配
给这些选民的第二选择 -

东基地 - 总共有 32 票。

然后我们比较最高偏好
并再次削减最后一名的选择。

这次北基地被淘汰了。

它的居民的第二选择
本来是南基地,

但既然已经走了
,选票就投给了他们的第三选择。

这使得东部 58 票超过西部的 42 票,
使其成为赢家。

但这似乎也不公平。

东方不仅
以倒数第二的位置开始,

而且大多数人将其列为
他们最不喜欢的两个选项之一。

我们可以尝试
多轮投票,

而不是使用排名,前两名获胜者
将进行单独的决选。

通常,这意味着 West 和 North
赢得第一轮

,North 赢得第二轮。

但是东基地的居民意识到

,虽然他们没有
赢得选票,

但他们仍然可以使
结果向有利于自己的方向倾斜。

在第一轮中,他们投票
给了南方基地而不是他们自己的基地,

成功地阻止了北方基地
的晋级。

由于东基地居民的这种“战术投票”

,尽管人口最少,但南很容易赢得了第二轮
。 如果

一个系统鼓励对你的偏好撒谎,它可以被称为公平和良好的

吗?

也许我们需要做的
是让选民

在每一次可能的正面交锋中表达自己的偏好。

这被称为孔多塞方法。

考虑一场比赛:
西部对北部。

所有 100 名殖民者都对他们
在两者之间的偏好进行投票。

所以这是 West 的 42 人与
来自北方、南方和东方的 58 人,

他们都更喜欢北方。

现在
对其他五场比赛做同样的事情。

获胜者将是
获胜次数最多的基地。

在这里,北胜三
,南胜二。

这确实是两个
最中心的位置,

而北的优势在于不是
任何人最不喜欢的选择。

那么这是否使孔多塞方法
成为一种理想的投票系统呢?

不必要。

考虑一次
有三名候选人的选举。

如果选民更喜欢 A 而不是 B,B 而不是 C,
但更喜欢 C 而不是 A,则

此方法无法选出获胜者。

几十年来,研究人员
和统计学家已经提出了

数十种复杂
的投票方式和计票方式,

其中一些甚至已经
付诸实践。

但无论您选择哪一个,

都可以想象它会
产生不公平的结果。

事实证明,我们直观
的公平概念

实际上包含许多
可能相互矛盾的假设。

一些选民
比其他选民拥有更大的影响力似乎是不公平的。

但是,简单地
忽略少数人的偏好

或鼓励人们玩这个系统似乎也不公平。

事实上,数学证明
表明,对于任何

有两个以上选项的选举,

设计一个至少
不违反

某些理论上
理想标准的投票系统是不可能的。

因此,虽然我们经常将民主
视为简单的计票问题,

但也值得考虑谁
从不同的计票方式中受益。